Politics and resource use in local government service production by Kalseth, Jorid
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Politics and resource use in local government service production 
 
 
Empirical analyses of administration and long-term care in Norway 
 
 
 
 
Jorid Kalseth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dr.polit.-avhandling 2003 
Institutt for samfunnsøkonomi 
Fakultet for samfunnsvitenskap og teknologiledelse 
Norges teknisk–naturvitenskapelige universitet, NTNU 
Trondheim 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISBN-nummer 82-471-5164-2 
Acknowledgements 
  
This thesis is a result of research undertaken at the Department of Economics at the 
Norwegian University of Science and Technology. The work was supervised by 
Professor Jørn Rattsø. I would like to thank him for his insightful guidance, patience 
and support throughout the work. Jørn is co-author of two of the chapters, and has 
also offered constructive critique and suggestions for improvements of the other 
chapters. I would also like to thank the staff members at the Department of 
Economics for providing me with a stimulating work environment.  
 
The funding from the Norwegian University of Science and Technology and the 
financial support from the Norwegian Research Council to some of the research 
included in the thesis are gratefully acknowledged. I would also like to thank my 
present employer SINTEF Unimed Health Services Research for contributing to the 
completion of the thesis. 
 
The data used in the thesis are provided from Statistics Norway and the Norwegian 
Social Data Services. None of the institutions are responsible for the analyses of the 
data and the interpretation of results.  
 
 
 
 
 
Trondheim, Oktober 2002 
 
Jorid Kalseth 

Contents 
 
 
Chapter 1:  Introduction and summary 
 
Chapter 2: Spending and overspending in local government administration: A 
minimum requirement approach applied to Norway. 
 With Jørn Rattsø, published in European Journal of Political Economy, 
vol. 11 (1995), p. 239-251. 
 
Chapter 3: Political control of administrative spending: The case of local 
governments in Norway 
 With Jørn Rattsø, published in Economics and Politics, vol. 10 (1998), 
p. 63-83. 
 
Chapter 4: Bargaining over output and effort- a dynamic model of sponsor-bureau 
interaction. 
 
Chapter 5: Political determinants of efficiency variation in municipal service 
production: An analysis of long-term care in Norway. 
 
Chapter 6: Horizontal equity versus local discretion in decentralized public 
provision systems: An empirical analysis of client care levels within 
long-term care of elderly in Norway 

Chapter 1 
 
 
Introduction and summary 
 
 1
1.  Introduction 
  
This thesis includes five essays studying the performance of local governments in 
Norway. Four of the essays address variation in resource allocation and efficiency 
between the local governments, the fifth analyses variation in service levels. The thesis 
has mainly an empirical orientation. One essay, presented in Chapter 4, provides a 
theoretical contribution to the study of efficiency variation in public sector service 
production. The empirical analyses concentrate on two spending components, local 
government administration and long-term care. Chapter 2 and 3 study variation in the size 
of local government administration. Administration is a necessary input in both service 
provision and in the political decision-making process, and administrative spending 
competes with welfare services for resources. The size of the administrative component 
determines the amount of resources available for the production of welfare services. Cost 
efficiency and service levels within long-term care are the topics in Chapter 5 and 6 
respectively. Long-term care for elderly and disabled persons is, besides primary 
education, the major expenditure component of the municipalities. 
  
Two characterizing features of the local government sector have inspired the analyses. 
First, the local government sector is the major provider of welfare services and represent 
more than 20 percent of total employment. Given the size and importance of the local 
government sector, efficient provision of services is an interesting area of study. 
However, the incentives for efficient resource utilization may be weak. The financing of 
the local government activities is mainly tax based, through local income tax revenue 
sharing and intergovernmental grants. Thus the individual welfare services provided are 
either free of charge or heavily subsidized. There is hardly any competition on the supply 
side. Furthermore Tiebout competition is likely not to be efficient (Anderson and Carlsen 
1997). Second, there are huge differences in per capita spending levels between local 
governments. This has motivated the investigation of the variation between local 
governments. The analyses presented here document relatively large differences in 
resource utilization among the municipalities. The next step of the analysis addresses the 
question of why the municipalities differ in their economic performance. The common 
approach in the thesis is the understanding that the local decision-making process is 
pluralistic and fragmented involving different actors with, at least partly, conflicting 
interests regarding efficiency and service levels. Hence variation in performance is 
investigated in relation to characteristics of the political structure of the local 
governments.  
  
The analytical approach to measuring efficiency is based on the methodology developed 
for productivity analyses of industries where 'best practice' serves as a reference point. 
Due to problems of identifying and measuring the administrative output a modification of 
the production frontier approach is developed for the analysis of resource utilization in 
local government administration. The concept of a minimum requirement administrative 
spending frontier is defined, serving as a benchmark for the estimation of administrative 
overspending. The analysis of efficiency within long-term care is based on the traditional 
efficiency analysis approach, using the number of client served as an approximation to 
the long-term care output. Data envelopment Analysis (DEA) is used to establish the 
‘best practice’ reference frontier in the analyses in chapters 2, 3 and 5. DEA is a 
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deterministic, non-parametric method designed to measure relative efficiency of peer 
group organizations. The advantages of DEA is that it handles multiple inputs and 
outputs and allows comparison of local government performance without having to 
specify organizational goals. The disadvantage is that it makes no allowance for 
statistical noise, implying that all deviation from the frontier is attributed as measured 
inefficiency. Thus the method is sensitive to error of measurement and outlier 
observations. However DEA avoid making strong assumptions on functional form and 
distribution of inefficient units. In chapter 5 different output vectors are specified to 
check for the sensitivity of results to the chosen output vector. It is important to bear in 
mind that the indices generated by DEA reflects errors of measurement of the input-
output combinations and hence may incorporate factors other than efficiency. The 
efficiency indices resulting from the frontier analyses serves, in Chapter 3 and 5, as the 
basis of analyses of the influence of the local political structure on the performance of 
local governments. 
  
The analyses of variation in local government performance are based on models of the 
local decision-making process. The approach is inspired by the public choice literature 
applying the usual assumption of maximizing behavior to the public sector. The 
conventional approach to the analysis of local governments is the median voter model, 
concentrating on individual demand functions for public services (Rubinfeld 1987). The 
median voter approach has serious shortcomings in the case of Norway, since the local 
governments take decisions in a multidimensional policy space and a well-established 
party system controls the local council. Instead a community preference model (Wildasin 
1986) serves as the benchmark model. The political decision-making is guided by the 
preferences of the political leadership in the community. Starting with Rattsø (1989) this 
has become the standard approach in analyses of local governments in Norway. The 
approach also takes into account the centralized system of financing of the local 
governments in Norway, constraining the income side of the municipal budget.  
 
The community preference model represents a simplification of the local decision-
making process. The model does not address the interaction and the conflicting interests 
of the participants in the local budget process. The complexity of the decision-making 
structure is taken into account by expanding the community preference model, 
incorporating the preferences of the bureaucracy. The understanding is that the budget 
process involves negotiations between politicians and bureaucrats. The modeling 
approach lends from theories of bureaucracy in the Niskanen (1971) tradition and from 
the wage-bargaining literature. The bargaining approach serves as the basis of Chapters 
3-5. The main idea behind the empirical analyses in Chapter 3 and 5 is that characteristics 
of the local political and institutional structure influence the bargaining outcome. Inspired 
by the literature on political-institutional determinants of public spending and budget 
deficits, the bargaining power of the political leadership is approximated by measures of 
political strength. Chapter 5 also investigates whether institutional settings, notably the 
organization of the budget process, are important for final outcomes. 
 
Chapter 6 departs from the previous chapters both in the unit of analysis and the outcome 
measure. The essay combines data on individual clients and municipal characteristics to 
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study whether the type and level of long-term care services offered client with identical 
attributes varies between local governments. The discussion focuses on the equalizing 
properties of the centralized system of financing of the local government sector in 
Norway. A multi-level modeling approach is applied taking into account municipality-
specific effects by incorporating random variation at both the individual and municipal 
level. The study is well suited to illustrate the problem of spurious regression relationship 
in analysis of data having a natural hierarchical structure, also known as Moulton bias 
(Moulton 1986), when applying standard OLS or similar regression techniques. Thus the 
results when applying standard regression techniques are also presented, illustrating the 
severe biases in standard errors for the variables measured at the municipal level when 
ignoring the interdependence of clients residing within the same community. 
 
The analysis of variation in resource utilization presented in this thesis does not control 
for the quality aspect of local government service production. This may represent a 
potential problem of confusing high quality for low efficiency. In order to control for 
quality one has to define and measure quality. Both tasks represent major challenges and 
have been beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
The next section gives a brief summarization of the essays. The theoretical and 
methodological approaches, the institutional and political structure of the Norwegian 
local governments, and finally the data used are outlined in greater detail in the chapters. 
Section 3 provides some caveats and limitations of the analyses, and points to some 
issues that are left to be dealt with in future research. 
 
 
 
2.  Summary of the essays 
  
Chapter 2: Spending and overspending in local government administration: A minimum 
requirement approach applied to Norway 
  
This chapter provides a cross-sectional analysis of spending variation in local 
government administration. The definition of administration applied includes 'central 
administration' and the sectoral administration of the five main services (education, 
health care/long-term care, social services, culture and infrastructure), representing about 
16 percent of total current spending of local governments. Very small, large and 
extremely rich municipalities are excluded from the analysis. Due to constraints on 
political and administrative organization the size of the administrative component are 
very high in the smallest municipalities. The scope and organization of activities and 
hence the definition of central and sectoral administration of the largest cities is expected 
to differ from the smaller municipalities. The very rich municipalities are local producers 
of electric power and are outliers on any dimension of the local government service 
production.  
  
The paper develops a method of defining and estimating administrative overspending. 
The point of departure is the community preference model focusing on the final demand 
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for services. While the central administration, responsible for the overall coordination of 
the local authority, is assumed to compete with the welfare services for resources, the 
demand for sectoral administration is derived from the demand for sectoral services. The 
demand model of administration identifies local factors influencing the per capita 
administrative spending; the total per capita budget, population size and other socio-
demographic factors affecting the composition of services.  
 
The effect of population size is important in relation to the discussion of optimal size of 
the municipalities and local government consolidations. Estimation of the demand 
function for administration reveals a scale effect with regard to population size. However 
the scale effect is found to be declining with size and diseconomies of scale cannot be 
ruled out for the large municipalities. 
  
The demand model helps define a benchmark for the estimation of administrative 
overspending. The minimum requirement administration frontier represents the 
authorities with the lowest per capita resource use in administration correcting for local 
demand factors. Thus administrative overspending is calculated by comparing the 
administrative spending of each authority with the spending level of a hypothetical best 
practice reference authority with similar local characteristics as the municipality under 
investigation. Administrative overspending can be related both to technical inefficiency 
in the production of administrative activities and ineffectiveness with regard to the size of 
the administrative component in relation to service levels. 
  
The result of the best practice frontier analysis implies an estimate of the administrative 
overspending of 17 percent, using the DEA method to identify the minimum requirement 
administration frontier. The estimated overspending is higher, 28 percent, using a 
deterministic parametric method to establish the best practice frontier.  
 
 
Chapter 3: Political control of administrative spending: The case of local governments in 
Norway 
  
Chapter 3 takes the analysis of administrative spending a step further and tries to explain 
some of the variation in the size of local government administration. Here only central 
administration is examined. To have comparable institutions, we concentrate the analysis 
to the municipalities with a population size between 5,000-50,000 inhabitants, covering 
40 percent of the municipalities. Again a model of the political demand of local services 
serves as a starting point. The paper expands the model by incorporating the role and 
interests of the administrators. Given the role of the administration in the local budget 
process, administrators are expected to be able to influence outcomes. In accordance with 
theories of bureaucracy initiated by Niskanen (1971), the administration is assumed to 
prefer higher administrative spending than the political leadership. The budget process is 
seen as involving negotiations between the administration and the political leadership 
over the size of administrative spending. The modeling of the bargaining process is kept 
simple focusing on the concept of relative bargaining strength of the political leadership. 
The level of administrative spending resulting from the budget process varies inversely 
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with the bargaining power of the local politicians. The key hypothesis of the study is that 
a strong political leadership is more capable of resisting bureaucratic pressure. 
 
Two measures of political strength are investigated. The first relates to the basis of the 
political leadership in the local council, and classifies the political leadership according to 
two dimensions, minority/majority and coalition/non-coalition. One-party majority 
represents a strong political leadership, while a minority coalition is seen as a weak 
political leadership. The second measure of political strength included captures party 
fragmentation of the local council. Party fragmentation is assumed to increase the 
complexity of the bargaining situation which the bureaucracy can take advantage of. The 
analysis also controls for the ideological orientation of the local council. Socialists are 
assumed to prefer higher administrative spending than non-socialists do. 
 
Two methodological approaches are applied in estimating political determinants of 
administrative spending. The first estimates the demand function of administrative 
spending adding political structure. The second takes advantage of the minimum 
requirement frontier approach developed in chapter 2, and analyses the political 
determinants of administrative overspending using a Tobit-model. 
 
The bargaining model implies interaction between preferences and relative bargaining 
strength. We are not able to identify and separate the influence of preferences from the 
influence of bargaining power in estimating the influence of political strength on 
administrative spending. The empirical analysis gives us an estimate of the total effect of 
the political structure variables on administrative spending. 
 
The results confirm the importance of political structure for the size of local government 
administration. The type of coalition government and ideology affect administrative 
spending in the hypothesized way. The estimated difference in spending levels between 
minority coalitions and one party majorities is about the same with the two estimation 
methods used. However while one party majorities stand out when estimating the 
expanded demand model, minority coalitions deviates from the other types of political 
leadership when estimating administrative overspending. Administrative spending is not 
found to be significantly related to party fragmentation.  
 
 
Chapter 4: Bargaining over output and effort - a dynamic model of sponsor-bureau 
interaction 
 
This chapter develops further the bargaining approach to the analysis of the local 
decision-making process, focusing on the consequences of strong bureaucratic influence 
and weak political leadership for public sector efficiency and service levels. The interests 
of the bureaucrats and the modeling of the bargaining game are more elaborated here than 
in the previous chapter, e.g. introducing efficiency as a parameter in the bureaucratic 
decision problem and recognizing that the participants in the budget process interact 
repeatedly. Making the model more formal also implies making stronger assumptions on 
the basis of bureaucratic influence. 
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The model is kept quite general, relevant for different public sector services. The paper 
models the interaction of a sponsor and a public bureau in determining the bureau's 
budget, level of output and efficiency. Efficiency is related to the level of effort the 
bureau put into the production of services. Effort plays the same role as slack in the 
conventional models of bureaucracy assuming that the bureaucrats have preferences for 
output and slack. The model assumes authority-based bureaucratic influence on 
outcomes, reflecting the role and responsibilities of the bureaucracy in the decision-
making process. The sponsor-bureau interaction is modeled as a bargaining game, 
introducing bargaining strength as well as preferences as a key variable in the analysis of 
bureaucratic influence. The model also extends the Niskanen-type bureaucracy models by 
taking into account that the sponsor and the bureau interact repeatedly. The modeling 
strategy is inspired by Espinasa and Rhee's (1989) and Strand's (1989) modeling of wage 
bargaining as a repeated game. 
  
The bargaining context, defined by the organization of the budget process, takes form of 
a sequential game where the bureau decides the level of effort and the sponsor decides 
the bureau's budget. Recognizing that the budget process is a reoccurring event opens for 
other and superior outcomes than the outcome of the one-shot budget game. An implicit 
bargaining process resulting in the generalized Nash bargaining solution is assumed to 
describe the bureau-sponsor interaction in the repeated game setting. The players' 
emphasis on future outcomes is important. Impatience narrows the bargaining space and 
may constrain the Nash bargaining solution, in which case the Pareto-efficient solution is 
not attainable. The paper focuses on the effect of a change in the relative bargaining 
strength of the bureau vis-à-vis the sponsor. In the unconstrained case increased 
bargaining power of the sponsor increases effort. The effect on production is ambiguous. 
  
The structure of the budget process is important for the outcome of the bargaining game. 
Two different settings are investigated, a bottom-up type process where the bureau set 
effort before the sponsor decide the budget and a top-down type process where the 
sequence of moves are inverted. In the case of a constrained solution of the bargaining 
game increased bargaining power of the sponsor increases effort and production in the 
bottom-up case, whereas production is lowered in the top-down case. The effect on effort 
is indecisive in the top-down case. An increase in effort is more likely the less emphasis 
the bureau put on future outcomes. 
  
 
Chapter 5: Political determinants of efficiency variations in municipal service 
production: An analysis of long-term care in Norway 
  
In this chapter the bargaining approach elaborated in chapter 4 is applied in an analysis of 
efficiency variation in the municipalities’ provision of long-term care. As a 
simplification, only unconstrained solutions are considered. Thus a negative relationship 
between the bargaining strength of the bureaucracy and efficiency is expected. As in 
chapter 3 the main idea is to link the relative bargaining strength of the political 
leadership vis-à-vis the service department to characteristics of local politics. Political 
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fragmentation is associated with collective action problems, assumed to weaken the 
bargaining position of the local political leadership. The impact of institutional 
arrangements is also analyzed, first and foremost the organization of the annual budget 
process. A top-down budget process is expected to give the political leadership a better 
position at the outset of the budget negotiations. 
  
Measuring output represents a challenge in efficiency analysis of public sector service 
provision. The output of long-term care is associated with concepts such as improved 
quality of life, or improved capability of managing everyday living, conditions that are 
hard to measure. This study follows previous efficiency studies of long-term care services 
relating output to the number of clients served. Output is measured by a vector of 
recipients of services, disaggregated according to age and mode of care. The concept of 
efficiency applied here thus relates to the volume of clients served, controlled for client 
composition, relative to the amount of resources used. This approach implicitly assumes 
that the quality of care does not vary between the municipalities or is unrelated to 
resource use per “standardized” client. Norwegian studies of user satisfaction with long-
term care services do not find any strong systematic relationship between measures of 
resource use or efficiency and user satisfaction (Dræge et al. 1997, Erlandsen et al. 1997).  
 
Data envelopment analysis is used to measure relative efficiency. Due to poor quality of 
the data on personnel use within long-term care operating costs is used as the input 
measure. Thus in our case the DEA analysis provides us with a measure of relative cost-
efficiency rather than technical efficiency. Variation in cost-efficiency is analyzed by use 
of the Tobit method. 
 
The results of the analysis of efficiency variation are consistent with the hypothesis that 
political fragmentation improves the bargaining position of the service department. Cost-
efficiency in the provision of long-term care is found to be negatively related to political 
fragmentation. Several measures of political fragmentation are investigated. The number 
of parties represented in the local council produces the best fit with the data, probably 
reflecting the consensual properties of the organization of local politics in Norway. 
Ideology, measured by the party-composition of the local council, also seems to matter. 
Bourgeois domination in local politics is found to improve cost-efficiency.  
  
The results reveal no direct effect of the organization of the budget process on efficiency 
within long-term care. However separate analyses of the three types of budget processes 
identified, indicates that the organization of the early stages of the budget process is 
important for the impact of party politics, and political and administrative organization, 
on outcomes. Party politics only seems to matter in a top-down type process with the 
executive board involved in all stages of the drafting of the budget. With a bottom-up 
type process, involving the service departments and a corresponding political committee 
in the early stages of the process, party politics seems to be played down. Finally, when 
the chief administrative officer controls the initial budget preparation the political 
influence on outcomes seems to weaken. Instead administrative organization is found to 
be important in this case. 
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Tobit estimation is chosen due to the properties of the calculated efficiency indices. The 
Tobit method is based on the assumption that the underlying distribution is normal. 
Conditional moments tests indicate that the normality assumption is violated in our case. 
However, results based on the Generalized Logistic Tobit model, allowing for asymmetry 
and thicker tails than the normal distribution, show that the estimated effects are quite 
robust to the altering of the assumption of the underlying distribution. 
 
 
Chapter 6: Horizontal equity versus local discretion in decentralized public provision 
systems: An empirical analysis of client care levels within long-term care of elderly in 
Norway 
  
In Norway there is an ongoing debate on the organization of the responsibilities of the 
welfare state and the scope of central government regulation of the local government 
sector. One aspect of the debate is the concern over the stated national goal of equal 
access to welfare services across the country. This chapter addresses the question of 
variation in service levels between the local governments, investigating whether the 
centralized system of financing of the local government sector succeeds in equalizing 
local economic opportunities. 
  
The study utilizes a unique dataset on local government provision of services to elderly 
long-term care clients. Two aspects of care is analyzed, the probability of receiving 
nursing home care and the number of hours of care provided to home care clients. The 
analyses include two different sets of explanatory variables. A set of client attributes is 
included to capture individual variation in needs. While a set of variables characterizing 
the local authority, assumed to affect local priorities, is included to capture variation in 
local service levels. The dataset is available for 40 of the 435 Norwegian municipalities, 
covering about 20,000 elderly long-term clients. Since small municipalities are 
underrepresented in the sample, the analysis is conducted both on the full sample and on 
a sample excluding the municipalities with less than 3,000 inhabitants. 
  
The community preference model serves as the theoretical framework for the analysis, 
incorporating the distribution of services among clients as arguments in the preference 
function. A multilevel modeling approach is applied in the empirical analyses taking into 
account group specific random effects. The results show that client characteristics are the 
predominant determinants of individual consumption of publicly provided long-term 
care. However, we do find that variations in client care levels also are related to 
characteristics of the local governments. The centralized system of finance does not seem 
to secure equalization of economic opportunities to provide uniform service levels, the 
care provided is found to vary systematically with the level of municipal income. The 
estimated average effect of a 10,000 NOK increase in per capita municipal income 
(equals 1,3 standard deviations) is to increases the probability of nursing home care by 4 
percentage points and the weekly hours of home care per client by 13 percent. The result 
only applies when including the small municipalities in the sample. There is less variation 
in municipal income among the larger municipalities. High-income municipalities are 
typically also small.  
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Client care levels also varies with sosio-demographic and political characteristics of the 
local government. The influence of local politics demonstrates the exercise of local 
discretion in setting standards for care. Variation in service levels related to variation in 
local priorities challenges the national goal of horizontal equity. This represents a 
dilemma for the national authorities since more central government control and direct 
regulation of service standards challenge the foundation of local self-governance.  
 
 
3. Discussion 
 
The community preference model expanded to incorporate the interest and influence of 
the local bureaucracy serves as the theoretical point of departure for the analyses 
presented in this thesis. The thesis does not explore alternative models to the study of 
variation in local government performance. The results from the empirical analyses may 
also correspond with hypothesis derived from alternative models. Exploring other 
approaches, and finding ways of discriminating between alternative models, will deepen 
our understanding of the nature of the challenges facing the local governments.  
 
The thesis documents the importance of local politics in explaining variation in local 
government performance. The main idea has been to link poor performance to weak 
political leadership. The concept of weak political leadership is operationalized by 
different measures reflecting the composition of the local council. Undeniably there is a 
big leap from the theoretical model, introducing the concept of the relative bargaining 
strength of the politician, to the empirical implementation. Even though the leap is 
thoroughly discussed and motivated in the thesis, the theoretical foundation for the 
understanding of the functioning of the political system needs further development.  
 
The Norwegian local governments are multi-purpose authorities. The empirical analyses 
in this thesis are single service analysis and do not address possible interdependencies 
between the service departments in the local decision process. A multi-service model 
involving two or more services opens for complex strategic interactions among the 
service departments, as well as between the service departments and the political 
leadership. Whether such an analysis would radically alter the conclusions in this thesis 
remains to be examined.  
 
Exploring the relationship between quality and resource use should be given high priority 
in future analyses of local government performance. A proper large-scale investigation 
must await better data. Hopefully the increased public attention in recent years on the 
quality aspect of public sector service provision will stimulate research on the 
construction of valid and reliable quality measures for local government services.  
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Abstract 
 
The paper focuses on the interaction of a public bureau and its sponsor in determining 
the bureau’s budget, level of output and efficiency. The bureau is assumed to control 
effort whilst the sponsor controls the size of the budget. The model takes into account 
that the sponsor and the bureau interact repeatedly. The bureau-sponsor interaction is 
modeled as a bargaining game. The relative bargaining strength of the sponsor 
influences the outcome of the game. The effect on output and efficiency of a 
weakening of the relative bargaining strength of the sponsor depends on the structure 
of the budget decision process and the time preferences of the players. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Theories of public sector behavior within the public choice tradition have in common 
that they apply the usual assumption of maximizing behavior to the public sector. 
Thus in economic models of the behavior of public sector bureaus the bureaucrats are 
assumed to pursue their own objectives, which, in at least some respects, conflict with 
the objectives of their financial sponsor, typically a political body. The first to 
develop a formal model of determination of bureaucratic supply was Niskanen (1968, 
1971). The model features a budget-maximizing bureau supplying services in 
exchange for a budget. The bureau faces a budget constraint; total costs cannot exceed 
the maximum budget the sponsor is willing to grant for a given level of services. 
Niskanen’s model supports the frequently stated assertion of bureaucratic oversupply.  
 
The critique of Niskanen’s model has centered on the assumption of the behavioral 
motivation of the bureaucrats, and on the modeling of the relation between the bureau 
and the sponsor. Niskanen depict the bureaucrats as budget-maximizers on the 
grounds that budget-maximization should be an adequate proxy for utility 
maximization since variables entering the bureaucrat’s utility function, e.g. ‘salary, 
perquisites of the office, public reputation, power, patronage, output of the bureau, 
ease of making changes, and ease of managing the bureau’ (Niskanen 1971, p. 38), 
are positively associated with the size of the budget1. In Niskanen’s model budget-
maximization is equivalent to maximizing output within the constraint that production 
costs does not exceed the total budget. The output is however produced at least costs2, 
implying that there is no X-inefficiency in the production of services. Migué and 
Bélanger (1974) criticized the budget-maximization assumption on this account. Cost-
efficient production is not consistent with the pursuit of the utility enhancing activities 
listed by Niskanen. Budget maximization is not necessary equivalent with utility 
maximization. Later extensions of Niskanen’s original model allow for both output 
and slack, i.e. the difference between total budget and minimum production costs, to 
enter the bureaucrats utility function (Migué and Bélanger 1974, Niskanen 1975, 
Miller 1977, Moene 1986).  
 
For divergent preferences to be significant in the sponsor-bureau relationship the 
bureaucrats must be able to influence outcomes. The source of bureaucratic discretion 
and the modeling of the relation between the sponsor and the bureau have been a 
recurring question in the bureaucracy literature (e.g. Breton and Wintrobe 1975, 
Miller 1977, Miller and Moe 1983, Moene 1986, Chan and Mestelman 1988). Bendor 
(1988) makes a distinction between two sources of bureaucratic discretion; authority-
based and information-based agenda control. In the first case bureaucratic discretion 
is a result of the institutional structure of the decision making process. Both 
bureaucrats and politicians have complete and perfect information about production 
costs and preferences. However the authority granted the parties in the decision 
making process determines the parties’ relative power to influence outcomes. In the 
latter case bureaucratic discretion stems from asymmetric information concerning 
production costs and/or preferences. In Niskanen’s formal model bureau discretion is 
a result of authority-based agenda control. The relation between the bureau and its 
                                                           
1 Niskanen stated that the two last variables are negatively related to the size of the total budget, but 
positively related to increases in the total budget.  
2 When the solution of the budget maximization problem is cost constrained as pointed out in Miller 
and Moe (1983). 
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sponsor is characterized as a bilateral monopoly; the sponsor is dependent on the 
bureau to supply services and the bureau only receives financial support from the 
sponsor. As Miller and Moe (1983) points out this is not taken into account in the 
modeling of the bureau-sponsor relationship. The bureau is given monopoly power 
while the sponsor is passive, granting whatever budget the bureau request as long as 
the net benefit to the sponsor is non-negative. However, Niskanen justifies the passive 
role of the sponsor by arguing that the sponsor lacks the incentive or opportunity to 
obtain correct information about production costs, i.e. implicitly assuming that the 
bureaucrat has an information advantage.  
 
Breton and Wintrobe (1975) refute the assumption of a passive sponsor. Governing 
politicians concerned with reelection will make (optimal) use of control devices 
(which is available only at some cost) to limit the distortions caused by superior 
information on part of the bureaucrats. Breton and Wintrobe and later theories of 
legislative control (e.g. Weingast and Moran 1983, Weingast 1984, McCubbins, Noll 
and Weingast 1989) treat the issue of bureaucratic discretion as a political control 
problem. Bureaucratic compliance is ensured by devising mechanisms for ex post or 
ex ante political control. The politicians hold the upper hand in the bureau-sponsor 
relation and determine policy outcomes. While Niskanen’s model is criticized for 
assuming a passive sponsor, theories of legislative control can be accused of making 
just the opposite mistake, i.e. ‘overstate legislative power by assuming a strategic 
legislature and a passive bureau’ (Moe 1997, p. 466). Failing to take into account the 
possibility of strategic behavior on part of either party in the bureau-sponsor relation 
may be equally misleading. Or as Miller (1977, p. 41-42) puts it: ‘Both Niskanen and 
Breton-Wintrobe fail to consider the more complex possibility that the final result is 
determined by both the governing political party and the agency head in a bargaining 
context. One cannot determine the budget outcome just by looking at the preferences 
of one player or another; the players are engaged in a game’. 
 
This paper follows Miller (1977), Moene (1986) and Chan and Mestelman (1988) in 
expanding the Niskanen framework by introducing an active sponsor and model the 
strategic interaction between a bureau and its sponsor. Miller analyses a Cournot-type 
game where the sponsor decides the bureau’s budget and the bureau decides the 
amount spent on productive purposes. The level of output is determined by the 
simultaneous decisions taken by the two players. Like Miller we assume that 
bureaucratic discretion stems from bureau autonomy concerning production decisions. 
Specifically, following Carlsen (1992, 1994, 1996), we assume that the bureau is in a 
position to control the level of effort3. We also find Miller’s notion of bureau-sponsor 
bargaining appealing. However the formulation of the bargaining game differs from 
that of Miller. The modeling strategy is inspired by Espinosa and Rhee’s (1989) and 
Strand’s (1989) modeling of wage bargaining between a workers union and a firm as 
a repeated game.  
 
The budget process is an annual happening. Thus the sponsor and the bureau interact 
repeatedly. Unlike most previous analysis we take into consideration the dynamic 
aspect of the bureau-sponsor interaction4. The bargaining context is a budget process 
taking the form of a sequential game where the bureau decides the level of effort and 
                                                           
3 Which is analogous to Miller’s assumption that the bureau controls the amount of slack.  
4 E.g. Carlsen and Haugen’s  (1994) and Carlsen’s (1994) analysis of multi-period games between 
sponsor and bureau provides exceptions. 
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the sponsor decides the bureau’s budget. This stage game is repeated indefinitely. The 
outcome, i.e. the equilibrium level of output, effort and the budget, may differ from 
the solution of the stage game when the repeated interaction between the two players 
is taken into account. Both the sponsor and the bureau may benefit from cooperation 
in the long run. We propose a solution to the repeated game that is consistent with the 
constrained generalized Nash bargaining solution, i.e. we implicitly assume a 
bargaining process where the relative bargaining strength of the players determines 
the outcome.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model is described in section 2. 
Section 3 and 4 discusses the solution to the one-shot game, or the stage game, and 
the repeated game respectively. Moene (1986) and Chan and Mestelman (1988) 
shows in a static game setting that the outcome of the game depends on the 
institutional structure of the decision making process. The structure is also important 
in a repeated game setting. We analyze the consequences of altering the assumption 
on who makes the first move in the stage game in section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. The model 
 
We model a situation where a public bureau produces a service (x) financed by a 
budget appropriation (B) from its sponsoring institution. The relation between the 
budget and the production level is mediated by the level of effort the bureau puts into 
the production of services. The bureau’s output in period t is given by: 
 
0,0,0,0),( <<>>= eeLLeLttt ffffeLfx                                                       (1) 
 
where L is employment and e is the bureau’s effort, and there are diminishing return 
both to employment and effort. The number of workers can thus be substituted for 
effort in the production of services. Disregarding input of capital and other purchased 
inputs total spending at time t is equated with total labor costs: 
 
ttt LwB =                                                                                                                      (2) 
 
where w is the wage rate. In each period output and effort have to be determined, 
determining also the number of workers and the total budget (for a given wage level5). 
Both the sponsor and the bureau are in a position to influence outcomes, the sponsor 
through her control over budget appropriations and the bureau through its control over 
effort6, and both behave strategically in their own best interest. 
 
 
                                                           
5 The wage level is assumed to be exogenous. If we think of the sponsor representing a local 
government then the assumption is in accordance with a system of centralized wage bargaining, i.e. the 
wage level is determined in national negotiations between worker unions and employer associations, as 
is the case for local government employees in Norway. 
6 It is reasonable to assume that there are a lower and an upper limit on effort, i.e. e∈ [e-,e+]. The 
sponsor may react if the effort level set by the bureau is too low, e.g. if the bureau is clearly shirking. 
Thus there may be a lower limit on effort, e- >0, triggering negative sanctions from the sponsor if the 
bureau chooses an effort level below the limit. Similarly, it is reasonable to assume that there is an 
upper limit on effort, e+. In the following analysis interior solutions is considered, i.e. e-<e<e+.  
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The preferences of the sponsor are represented by the per period net benefit function:  
 
0,0,0,0),()( ><>>−= BBxxBxttt qvqvBqxvNV                                        (3) 
 
The sponsor benefits from the bureau’s provision of services. However budget 
appropriations necessary to finance the production of services carries an opportunity 
cost. Equation (1) and (2) defines implicit the budget, and thus the sponsor’s net 
benefit as function of output and effort (and the wage level, which is suppressed in 
(3’)): 
 
L
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Bxxe
L
t
Bettt f
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qnvexnvNV −=== > ,0),,( 0                               (3’) 
 
The sponsor’s net benefit is strictly increasing in effort. Higher effort allows a 
reduction in the budget allocated to the bureau without lowering production. The 
effect of higher output on the other hand is ambiguous. Higher production increases 
the utility of the sponsor (vx>0). However, for a given level of effort, higher 
production also requires a higher number of workers, and thus an increase in the 
budget allocated to the bureau, which contributes to a lowering of the sponsor’s net 
benefit (qb(w/fL)>0). Since the net benefit function is strictly quasi-concave in output 
and effort the effect on net benefit of increased production is positive for low 
production levels and negative when production is high, as illustrated in Figure 1. We 
return to the interpretation of the nvx=0 curve in the discussion of the solution of the 
one-shot game below. 
 
 
Figure 1 
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The preferences of the bureau are represented by the following strictly quasi-concave 
per period utility function: 
 
0,0),( <>= exttt uuexuU                                                                                  (4) 
 
The bureau is assumed to gain utility from output and disutility from effort. There is 
thus a trade-off between production and effort in the welfare of the bureau in each 
period t. Effort plays here the same role as slack in Migué and Belangér (1974), 
Miller (1977) and Moene (1986). A lowering of effort raises production costs by 
lowering productivity.  
 
Most previous analyses of determination of bureaucratic supply only consider the 
sponsor-bureau relation in a static context, i.e. one-shot games. We propose a 
dynamic model in which the strategic interaction between a bureau and its financial 
sponsor take form of a repeated game with an infinite horizon7. In infinitely repeated 
games equilibrium outcomes may emerge which would not be attainable if the game 
is played only once (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991, ch. 5). We model a solution to the 
repeated game consistent with an implicit bargaining process taking place. The 
bargaining context is as follows. At each time period t a budget process takes place 
determining the bureau’s budget, the level of effort and the quantity of services 
produced. The stage game played in each period is a sequential game where the 
bureau moves first setting effort, and the sponsor decides the bureau’s budget after 
observing the level of effort chosen by the bureau. Carlsen (1992) discusses why this 
may be a reasonable description of the sponsor-bureau interaction. The consequences 
of altering the sequence of moves are investigated in section 5. One possible 
equilibrium outcome of the repeated game is the equilibrium outcome if the game is 
played only once. This will be the outcome if the players are perfectly myopic. We 
start by solving the one-shot sequential game. 
 
 
3. The stage game 
 
In each period the bureau moves first announcing and committing to an effort level. 
This may be thought of as the bureau presenting a budget proposal committing it to a 
cost schedule announcing the total cost (the amount of labor input) associated with 
deliverance of different levels of services. The sponsor then responds by deciding the 
bureau’s budget. The backward induction outcome, or the Stackelberg equilibrium, is 
the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of this game. Thus we start by finding the 
sponsor’s best response in stage two of the game. The sponsor set the budget to 
maximize net benefits (equation (3)) taken into account the production function (1), 
the cost constraint (2) and the effort level set by the bureau. This amounts to finding 
the optimal level of output (and hence the optimal level of labor input) for a given 
effort level, i.e. maximize (3’) with respect to x. The first-order condition for this 
maximization problem is: 
 
                                                           
7 This does not necessarily imply that the game goes on forever. The infinite horizon case also 
describes situations where there is a chance that the game may terminate some time in the future. The 
requirement is that the players believe that the game will continue with high enough probability 
(Fudenberg and Tirole 1991, chapter 5).  
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0=xnv                (5) 
 
The solution to the sponsor’s decision problem can be illustrated by use of Figure 1. 
For a given effort level e1 the sponsor get the highest net benefit by choosing a budget 
that will produce the output level x1, i.e. the level of output balancing the marginal 
benefit of increased output (vx) against the increased cost incurred (qB(w/fL)). 
 
From (5) we derive the sponsor’s best budget response function B*(e) and the output 
response curve, x*(e) (again suppressing w), represented by the zero marginal net 
benefit of output (nvx=0) curve in Figure 1. The sign of the budget response, ∂B*/∂e, is 
indecisive if the cross-partial derivative of the production function fLe is positive8. 
Increased effort increases output and thus lowers the marginal utility of output and 
hence the marginal net benefit of the budget. This effect pulls in the direction of 
lowering the budget. However if an increase in effort increases the marginal 
productivity of employment the cost to the sponsor of increasing output is reduced. 
This effect contributes to an increase of the marginal net benefit of the budget, and 
thus pulls in the direction of increasing the budget. The slope of the output response 
curve ∂x*/∂e is positive if effort is a normal factor of production9. If ∂B*/∂e<0 this 
contributes to a lowering of output. However the initial increase in output caused by 
the increase in effort dominates when effort is a normal factor of production.  
 
In stage one of the game the bureau chooses the effort level e to maximize (4) taken 
into account the best response function of the sponsor, which gives us the following 
first-order condition: 
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The optimal effort level yielding the highest attainable utility for the bureau is found 
in the tangency between the output response curve of the sponsor and the indifference 
curve of the bureau, as illustrated in Figure 2, balancing the marginal costs and 
benefits of reducing effort.  
 
As discussed above the cost to the bureau of reducing effort in terms of forgone 
output can be separated into two effects. The first, direct effect comes via the 
production function. The second indirect effect comes via the effect on budget 
appropriations. The budget effect dampens the direct production effect, i.e. lowers the 
cost of reducing effort, if ∂B*/∂e<0.  
 
The equilibrium outcome of the one-shot game is thus (e*, x*(e)) yielding a net benefit 
of NV*=nv(x*,e*) for the sponsor and a utility level of U*=u(x*,e*) for the bureau.  
 
 
                                                           
8 See equation (A.1) in the appendix. 
9 See equation (A.2) in the appendix. 
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Figure 2 
 
The solution of the one-shot game is not efficient. All the points within the shaded 
area in Figure 2, yielding higher effort and output levels, are preferred by both the 
sponsor and the bureau to the equilibrium outcome (e*,x*). However these are not 
attainable in the one-shot game. Knowing the net benefit function of the sponsor, the 
bureau foresees that if it sets a higher effort level than e* the sponsor rationally will 
respond by picking a point along the reaction curve yielding a lower utility level for 
the bureau. A promise from the sponsor to pick a point within the shaded area as a 
response to the bureau setting e > e* is not credible in the one-shot game since this is 
not an optimal strategy for the sponsor once the bureau has set the effort level. A 
pareto improvement can not be enforced in the one-shot game without the use of 
binding contracts. 
 
 
4. The solution of the repeated game  
 
Taking the repeated nature of the game into account the loss of noncooperation may 
be substantial depending on how the players emphasize future outcomes. The 
increased loss of noncooperation as time passes provides incentives to implicitly 
cooperate to reach an outcome superior to the one-shot Nash equilibrium. The 
modeling of the repeated game follows Espinosa and Rhee (1989) (see also De la Rica 
and Espinosa 1997 and Bandyopadhyay 1997). 
 
A cooperative solution may be attainable in an infinitely repeated game if the parties 
adopt a strategy in which deviations from an agreed-upon outcome are punished; i.e. 
defection is deterred by threats of severe punishment of noncooperation. We assume 
that the players use classic trigger strategies where deviations are followed by a 
punitive action that lasts forever, i.e. the player cooperates as long as the other player 
cooperate and defection triggers a switch to noncooperation forever. Here the 
punishment scheme is assumed to be a reversion to the one-shot Nash equilibrium 
e*
x*
NV*
U*
x*(e)
e
x
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forever after. Then the so-called ‘Nash-threats’ folk theorem applies; for any payoff 
vector v yielding a higher payoff for both players than the static Nash equilibrium 
there is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game with 
payoffs v provided a high enough discount factor (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991, ch. 5). 
We consider stationary paths where the level of effort and output are constant over 
time, i.e. (et,xt)=(e,x) for all t. Stationary paths sustainable in a subgame-perfect 
equilibrium must satisfy the two following conditions: 
 
     *),( Uxeu ≥                        (7) 
[ ] [ ] ** )1()),((),()1(1 NVeexnvexnv δδδ −+≥−        (8) 
 
where U* and NV* are the one-shot Nash equilibrium levels of utility for the bureau 
and sponsor respectively, x*(e) is the output level on the reaction curve of the sponsor 
and δ is the discount factor of the sponsor. δ may reflect both pure time preferences of 
the sponsor and the probability that the game will end (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991, 
ch. 5). Thus we can get some cooperation even if there is a chance that the game will 
not continue10.  
 
The sequential nature of the stage game implies that the sponsor can punish defection 
on part of the bureau immediately, which means that it does not pay for the bureau to 
unilaterally deviate from the cooperative outcome. A cooperative outcome that gives 
the bureau a higher utility than the noncooperative Nash equilibrium is thus 
sustainable from the bureau’s point of view. This is captured in inequality (7). If, on 
the other hand, the sponsor defects the punishment will be effectuated only at the 
beginning of the next period. Thus the sponsor may profit from deviation. If the 
discounted value of the cooperative solution is greater than the value of an optimal 
one-shot deviation and then reversion to the noncooperative solution in all following 
periods the sponsor will have no incentive to deviate. The incentive compatible 
condition for the sponsor is stated in inequality (8).  
 
To be able to single out one among the multiple sustainable equilibrium combinations 
of effort and output we have to make a further assumption on how the equilibrium is 
reached. We assume that the mechanism the sponsor and the bureau use to choose 
among the multiple equilibria is an implicit bargaining process resulting in the 
generalized Nash bargaining solution. The level of effort and the budget sequentially 
announced by the bureau and sponsor then solves the following maximization 
problem: 
 
[ ] [ ] )1(**
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    (9) 
 
subject to  
 
0),(),( * ≤−= exuUexg             (7’) 
0),()),(()1(),,( ** ≤−−+= exnveexnvNVexh δδδ      (8’) 
 
                                                           
10 See also footnote 7. 
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rewriting constraint (7) and (8) as (7’) and (8’) respectively. We allow for asymmetric 
Nash bargaining solutions, where α and (1-α) are interpreted as the relative 
bargaining strength of the bureau and the sponsor respectively. Thus α represents 
asymmetries in the bargaining power not captured in preferences and the 
disagreement, or threat points (Binmore et al., 1986). The set of feasible outcomes of 
the repeated game is constrained to the area above the U*-curve the and below the 
curve representing h(x,e,δ)=011, as illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3 
 
The one-shot Nash equilibrium is represented by the point (e*,x*), and it will be the 
solution of the repeated game if the sponsor does not discount future outcomes, i.e. 
δ=0. For δ close enough to 1 (δ ≥δˆ , e.g. δ0 in Figure 3) the Nash bargaining solution 
will be unconstrained, and hence a point (eu,xu) on the contract curve12. Thus 
assuming a generalized Nash bargaining solution assures that the chosen equilibrium 
combination of output and effort is fully efficient given a high enough discount factor. 
Constraint (7’) is never binding unless α=0 and/or δ=0. For 0<δ< δˆ (e.g. δ1 in Figure 3) 
constraint (8’) is binding and the solution (ec,xc) is characterized by the tangency 
between the h(x,e,δ)=0 curve and an iso-Π curve, and lies between the one-shot Nash 
equilibrium and the fully efficient solution13. 
 
                                                           
11 When δ=0 the h(x,e,δ)=0 curve collapses to a single point, the noncooperative Nash equilibrium. 
When δ increases the location of the h(x,e,δ)=0 curve moves in the north-west direction, and it 
collapses with the NV* curve when δ equals 1. 
12 δˆ  is thus the minimum value of δ for which constraint (8’) is not binding. The contract curve 
represents the fully efficient solutions characterized by the tangency between the indifference curves of 
the bureau and the sponsor. See equations (A.3) in the appendix. 
13 See equations (A.5) in the appendix. 
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Changes in the discount factor will not affect the equilibrium (e,x) path as long as the 
discount factor is sufficiently high (δ ≥δˆ ) (in accordance with the assumption of 
independence of irrelevant alternatives (Nash 1950, 1953)). However when constraint 
(8’) is binding a reduction of δ implies that the gain to the sponsor from cheating 
increases and the h(x,e,δ)=0 curve moves down in the south-east direction, shrinking 
the set of sustainable (e,x) paths. Given reasonable assumptions on the shape of the Π- 
and h-function, a lower discount factor gives lower effort and output levels in the 
constrained solution14.  
 
For a given discount factor the outcome of the repeated game is determined by the 
relative bargaining strength of the sponsor and the bureau (α). The relative bargaining 
strength affects the shape of the Π-function. When the sponsor is in a position to 
dictate the outcome of the bargain, i.e. α=0, constraint (7’) is always binding (the 
bureau must at least get the utility obtained in the one-shot solution) and the Nash 
bargaining problem reduces to the sponsor maximizing her net benefit subject to 
g(x,e)=0, and h(x,e,δ)=0 when constraint (8’) is binding15. When the bureau is in the 
position to dictate the outcome of the bargain, i.e. when α=1, constraint (8’) is always 
binding and the Nash bargaining problem reduces to the bureau maximizing its utility 
subject to h(x,e,δ)=0. The outcome is then found in the tangency between the 
h(x,e,δ)=0 curve and an indifference curve of the bureau.  
 
In the intermediate case, i.e. 0<α<1, both players have power to influence the 
outcome of the bargain. When δ is high enough, such that constraint (8’) is not 
binding, the relative bargaining strength determine the location of the solution on the 
contract curve. The sign of the marginal effect on output and effort of an increase in 
the relative bargaining strength of the bureau along the contract curve is indecisive16, 
depending on the shape of the indifference curves of the bureau and the sponsor. 
Given reasonable assumptions, increased bargaining power of the bureau reduces 
effort17. In Figure 3 we have shown the case where in addition output is increasing in 
α. However this can not be the result in the constrained case.  
 
Constraint (8’) will sooner or later become binding as α increases. When the Nash 
bargaining solution is constrained the solution has to be a point along the h(x,e,δ)=0 
curve. At any point along the h(x,e,δ)=0 curve the sponsor is indifferent to upholding 
the cooperative agreement and cheating by deviating to the best response curve (by 
reducing the budget and thus the output level), i.e. the one period gain of cheating 
{nv(x*(e),e)-nv(x,e)} is just equal to the present value of the loss incurred by reverting 
to the noncooperative solution in all following periods {(δ/(1-δ))[nv(x,e)-nv(x*e*)]}. 
Thus if the bureau reduces effort this will lower the value of the agreement for the 
sponsor and thus violating (8’). This means that when the Nash bargaining solution is 
constrained output has to be reduced (since the net marginal benefit of output (nvx) is 
negative) if the bureau wishes to reduce effort. The bureau yields a higher utility 
moving downwards along the h(x,e,δ)=0 curve, i.e. moving towards the outcome that 
results when the bureau has all the bargaining power. Thus when the Nash bargaining 
                                                           
14 See equation (A.6) in the appendix. 
15 In this case is constraint (8’) binding when the curve representing h(x,e,δ)=0 crosses the U* curve to 
the left of the intersection between the contract curve and the U* curve. 
16 See equations (A.4) in the appendix. 
17 See equations (A.4’) in the appendix. 
 12
solution is constrained a strengthening of the bargaining power of the bureau reduces 
both effort and output18. 
 
To sum up, a weakening of the relative bargaining power of the sponsor contributes to 
a reduction in both the level of effort and output when the Nash bargaining solution is 
constrained. In the unconstrained case the prediction on output is indecisive.    
 
 
5. The sponsor moves first 
 
In the previous sections the bureau is assumed to move first, determining effort before 
the sponsor decides on the budget. Here we investigate the consequences of altering 
the sequence of moves. Now the sponsor is assumed to decide on the budget before 
the bureau set effort. Again, the static Nash equilibrium is found by backward 
induction. Once the budget is determined by the sponsor, the optimal response from 
the bureau is to set effort to equate the marginal benefit of reduced effort and the 
marginal cost in terms of reduced output. 
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The optimal effort level is thus found in the tangency between the production function 
for a given budget level and an indifference curve as shown in Figure 4. The optimal 
effort response to changes in the budget, ∂e*(B)/∂B, can be decomposed into a pure 
income effect and a relative-price effect19. The pure income effect is the effect of 
increased budget holding relative prices of effort and output, here the marginal 
productivity of effort, constant. Provided effort is a normal good for the bureau the 
pure income effect contributes to a lowering of effort when the budget increases. The 
relative-price effect hinges on the sign of the cross-partial derivative of the production 
function (feL). If the cross-partial derivative is positive, the marginal cost of reducing 
effort in terms of foregone output increases and the relative price effect pulls in the 
direction of increased effort. Assuming that the pure income effect dominates when 
feL is positive, the effort response curve is downward sloping, ∂e*/∂B<0, as shown in 
Figure 420.  
 
The sponsor set the budget to maximize net benefit taking into account the effort 
response of the bureau. The first order condition of the maximization problem is: 
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The optimal size of the budget for the sponsor equates the marginal benefit and 
marginal cost of the last dollar spent. When the bureau’s effort response to increases 
in the budget is negative this contributes to a lowering of the marginal benefit of 
                                                           
18 See equations (A.7) in the appendix. 
19 See equation (B.1) in the appendix. 
20 The sign of the slope of the effort response curve in the effort-output diagram is the same as of 
∂e*/∂B. See equation (B.2) in the appendix.  
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increasing the budget for the sponsor. The first order condition can also be expressed 
as follows: 
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Thus the first order condition of the maximization problem for the sponsor implies 
that the solution to the one-shot game is found in the tangency between an iso-net 
benefit curve and the effort response curve. If ∂e*/∂B<0 the tangency of the iso-net 
benefit curve and the effort response curve is found in the downward sloping part of 
the iso-net benefit curve as illustrated in Figure 4. Thus if ∂e*/∂B<0 the marginal net 
benefit of output (nvx) for the sponsor must be positive if (11’) is to be fulfilled.  
   
 
 
Figure 4 
 
Again, the Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game (e**,x**) is not efficient. Both the 
sponsor and the bureau would be better off if they were to agree on an effort-output 
combination within the shaded area in Figure 4. Such a combination may be attainable 
in the infinitely repeated game as discussed in section 4. When the sponsor moves 
first the bureau can punish defection on part of the sponsor immediately whereas the 
sponsor can punish defection on part of the bureau only at the beginning of the next 
period. Thus the incentive compatible conditions now becomes: 
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where U** and NV** are the one-shot Nash equilibrium levels of utility for the bureau 
and sponsor respectively, x*(B) and e*(B) is the level of output and effort on the 
reaction curve of the bureau and δb is the discount factor of the bureau. Thus the set of 
feasible outcomes of the repeated game now is constrained to the area below the NV*-
curve and above the curve representing g(x,e,δb)=021 in Figure 4. As in section 4 the 
equilibrium effort-output combination of the repeated game is assumed to be 
consistent with the generalized Nash bargaining solution. Constraint (12) and (13) 
replaces (7’) and (8’) in the maximization problem and the disagreement points (i.e. 
the utility/net benefit obtained in the one-shot game) changes when the sequence of 
moves in the stage game alters. The outcome of the repeated game is determined by 
the discount factor of the bureau and the relative bargaining strength of the two 
players. Again we characterize the solution by looking on what happens when the 
relative bargaining strength changes.   
 
When the sponsor has the upper hand in the bargain (α=0) constraint (12) will always 
be binding no matter the discount factor of the bureau. The Nash bargaining problem 
reduces to the sponsor maximizing her net benefit subject to g(x,e,δb)=0 and the 
outcome is found in the tangency between the g(x,e,δb)=0 curve and an iso-net benefit 
curve of the sponsor. When constraint (12) is binding changes in the relative 
bargaining strength imply a movement along the g(x,e,δb)=0 curve22. In Figure 4 the 
curve is drawn for two different discount factors (δb0>δb1). The g(x,e,δb)=0 curve is 
more likely to be positively sloped (i.e. gx<0) when δb is relatively high than when δb 
is relatively low. And further more for a given δb the g(x,e,δb)=0 curve is more likely 
to be positively sloped when output is relatively low than when output is relatively 
high. Increased bargaining strength of the bureau will lead to an increase in the 
equilibrium level of output whatever the slope of the constraint. The effect on effort 
on the other hand depends on which of the two regimes prevails. A strengthening of 
the bargaining power of the bureau will give a higher equilibrium level of effort when 
the constraint is positively sloped. The opposite is true when the constraint is 
negatively sloped.  
 
If, and when the g(x,e,δb)=0 curve crosses the contract curve the solution of the Nash 
bargain becomes unconstrained as the bargaining power of the bureau increases. In 
this case the discussion in section 4 applies. When the bureau is in the position to 
dictate the outcome of the bargain, i.e. α=1, constraint (13) is always binding (the 
sponsor must at least get the net benefit obtained in the one-shot solution) and the 
Nash bargaining problem reduces to the bureau maximizing its utility subject to 
h(x,e)=0, and g(x,e,δb)=0 when constraint (12) is binding. 
 
Thus when the sponsor moves first a strengthening of the bargaining power of the 
bureau will increase the equilibrium level of output when the Nash bargaining 
                                                           
21 When δb=0 the g(x,e,δb)=0 curve collapses to a single point, the noncooperative Nash equilibrium. 
When δb increases the location of the g(x,e,δb)=0 curve moves in the north-east direction, and it 
collapses with the U** curve when δb equals 1. 
22 See equations (B.4) in the appendix. 
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solution is constrained. The prediction on effort however is indecisive. A reduction in 
effort is more likely the lower the discount factor of the bureau. In the unconstrained 
case a strengthening of the bargaining power of the bureau will lower effort while the 
prediction on output is indecisive. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The interaction between a bureau and a sponsor is analyzed in a model where the 
bureau controls effort whilst the sponsor controls the size of the budget. The annual 
budget process is modeled as a sequential game. The outcome of the one-period game 
depends on the sequence of moves. When the bureau is the Stackelberg leader and the 
sponsor’s budget response to the bureau setting a higher effort level is negative the 
bureau will have an incentive to lower effort in order to induce the sponsor to grant a 
higher budget. When the sponsor is the Stackelberg leader she will hold back on the 
budget to force the bureau to increase effort when the effort response of the bureau to 
an increase in the budget is negative. Thus effort will be lower and the budget higher 
when the bureau moves first compared to the case when the sponsor moves first. The 
equilibrium level of output may be higher or lower. The outcome of a one period 
game is not efficient. Both the bureau and the sponsor would be better off with a 
change in the output/budget-effort combination. Thus there is room for the bureau and 
sponsor to bargain to reach a mutually beneficiary outcome. However an efficiency 
improving agreement is not enforceable in a one-period game without the use of 
binding contracts since the optimal strategy of the player making the last move is to 
defect once the other player has made her move.  
 
The budget process is repeated every year. Recognizing that the bureau and the 
sponsor interact repeatedly opens for the possibility of efficiency improving 
cooperative outcomes. The outcome of the repeated game is assumed to be consistent 
with a generalized Nash bargaining solution. The bargaining space is delimited by the 
players’ valuation of future outcomes. The less the players emphasis future outcomes 
the narrower the bargaining range and the lower the equilibrium effort and output 
level, i.e. the closer is the equilibrium outcome of the repeated game to the outcome 
of a one-shot game. When the sponsor moves first in the annual budget process the 
equilibrium level of effort may in fact be lower in the cooperative solution than in the 
one-shot game. The outcome of the repeated game is fully efficient if the discount 
factor is high enough such that the constraints stating that the players shall have no 
incentives to deviate are not binding. 
 
The generalized Nash bargaining solution allows for unequal bargaining strength of 
the bureau and the sponsor. The effect on the equilibrium level of output and effort of 
changes in the relative bargaining strength depends on the structure of the budget 
process and whether the bargaining solution is constrained or not. Given reasonable 
assumptions, increased bargaining strength of the bureau will always, except for some 
special cases, reduce the equilibrium level of effort. Increased bargaining strength of 
the bureau may lead to higher effort when the sponsor is the Stackelberg leader in the 
budget process and an increase in output increases the bureau’s payoff from the 
cooperative outcome compared to the payoff of defection. This may be the case if the 
discount factor of the bureau is high and the relative bargaining strength of the bureau 
is low such that the incentive compatible constraint of the bureau is binding. The 
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effect on the equilibrium level of output of increased relative bargaining strength of 
the bureau is indecisive when the Nash bargaining solution is unconstrained. When 
the solution is constrained the effect on output differs in the two institutional settings 
analyzed. Output falls as the bargaining power of the bureau increases when the 
bureau is the Stackelberg leader. The opposite is true when the sponsor is the 
Stackelberg leader. A constrained solution is more likely when the bargaining power 
of the bureau is high in the first case and when the bargaining strength of the bureau is 
low in the latter case. 
 
Even though a fully efficient outcome is attainable in the repeated game the outcome 
may still be undesirable from the societies point of view. If the sponsor represents the 
voters any outcome that does not fully reflect the preferences of the sponsor may be 
deemed undesirable.  
 
As long as the bureaucrats have some discretion they will be in a position to influence 
the outcomes of public sector decision making. However, the above analysis shows 
that relying on one-period models of bureau-sponsor interaction may give a too 
pessimistic view on public sector performance. Taking into account the repeated 
nature of the play the decision process may yield outcomes judged more favorable by 
the sponsor.  
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Appendix 
 
The reaction curve of the sponsor  
 
The first order condition of the one-shot maximization problem of the sponsor defines 
B*(e,w) and x*(e,w). Differentiating the first order condition with respect to e and 
solving for ∂B*/∂e gives us the slope of the budget reaction curve: 
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∂ * >0  if [ ] 0<− LLeeLL ffff . 
 
 
The unconstrained solution of the Nash bargaining problem 
 
We assume that the Π(x,e,w,α) function in the Nash bargaining problem is strictly 
concave in e and x. Maximizing Λ(x,e,w,α)=lnΠ(x,e,w,α) gives us the same solution 
as the original maximization problem. The first order condition of the unconstrained 
Nash bargaining solution can thus be expressed as: 
 
[ ] [ ] 0),,()1(),(),,,( 1*1* =−−+−=Λ −− eee nvNVwexnvuUexuwex ααα          (A.3.1) 
[ ] [ ] 0),,()1(),(),,,( 1*1* =−−+−=Λ −− xxx nvNVwexnvuUexuwex ααα           (A.3.2) 
 
(A.3) reduces to
x
e
x
e
nv
nv
u
u
= . 
 
(A.3) applies when δ ≥δˆ  and implicitly defines the equilibrium levels of effort and 
output as functions of α and w. Differentiating (A.3) with respect to α and solving for 
∂e/∂α and ∂x/∂α yields: 
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where Λee<0, Λxx<0 and 0)( 22 >Λ−ΛΛ= exxxeeD  follows from the 2. order condition 
of the maximization problem. [ ] [ ] 0),,(),( 1*1* <−−−=Λ −− eee nvNVwexnvuUexuα  
and [ ] [ ] 0),,(),( 1*1* >−−−=Λ −− xxx nvNVwexnvuUexuα . (A4) can alternatively be 
written as: 
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If e and x are ‘normal’ goods, i.e. ( ) 0>− exxxxe uuuu , ( ) 0<− exeeex uuuu , 
( ) 0<− exxxxe nvnvnvnv  and ( ) 0<− exeeex nvnvnvnv  then 0<∂
∂
α
e  and 
α∂
∂x   0 . 
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The constrained solution of the Nash bargaining problem 
 
Let A be the set of (e,x) such that u(x,e)≥U* and nv(x,e)≥NV*. We assume that the 
function h(x,e,w,δ) is quasi-convex in A. When constraint (8’) is binding (δ < δˆ ) the 
first order condition of the Nash bargaining problem becomes: 
 
0),,,(),,,( =−Λ δλα wexhwex ee             (A.5.1) 
0),,,(),,,( =−Λ δλα wexhwex xx             (A.5.2) 
     0),,,( =δwexh             (A.5.3) 
         0>λ             (A.5.4) 
 
where λ is the Lagrangean coefficient of the maximization problem. (A.5) implies that 
in optimum 
x
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(A.5) implicitly defines the equilibrium level of effort and output (when δ < δˆ ) as 
functions of δ, α and w. Differentiating (A.5) with respect to δ and solving for ∂e/∂δ 
and ∂x/∂δ, and with respect to α and solving for ∂e/∂α and ∂x/∂α we get: 
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where D3 is the determinant of the bordered Hessian. D3>0 is required by the 2. order 
condition of the maximization problem, and 
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The reaction curve of the bureau when the sponsor moves first 
 
The first order condition of the one-shot maximization problem of the bureau defines 
e*(B,w). Differentiating the first order condition with respect to B and solving for 
B
e
∂
∂ * gives us the slope of the reaction curve of the bureau: 
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second order condition of the maximization problem of the bureau. The first term in 
the numerator is positive when effort is a normal good in the utility of the bureau. 
 
In order to portray the reaction curve in the effort-output diagram we calculate 
de
dx  
given that the first order condition of the maximization problem of the bureau is 
fulfilled: 
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The two terms in the numerator are negative when output is a normal good in the 
utility of the bureau and employment is a normal factor of production. The 
denominator is positive when 0* <
∂
∂
B
e . Thus given reasonable assumptions the sign 
of the reaction curve in the effort-output diagram is the same as the sign of 
B
e
∂
∂ * . 
 
 
The constrained Nash bargaining solution when the sponsor moves first 
 
The calculation and description of the unconstrained solution in this case is analogous 
to the case where the bureau moves first, the difference being different threat points. 
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Only the comparative static for a change in the discount factor (δb) and the relative 
bargaining power of the bureau (α) in the constrained case is therefore shown here. 
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where µ>0 is the Lagrangean coefficient of the maximization problem with 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
Political determinants of efficiency variation in municipal service 
production: An analysis of long-term care in Norway. 
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Abstract
This paper addresses the implication of collective action problems of political
decision making for bureaucratic discretion and provides an empirical analy-
sis linking cost-eﬃciency of municipal service provision to political structure
and institutions. The theoretical approach focuses on the interaction of the
politicians and the bureaucrats in the budget process. The budget process
is modeled as a bargaining game between the politicians and the bureau-
cracy determining the level of eﬃciency and output. The relative bargaining
strength of the politicians influences the outcome of the game. A weaken-
ing of the relative bargaining power of the politicians reduces eﬃciency. In
the empirical analysis the relative bargaining strength of the politicians is
approximated by measures of the party fragmentation of the local council.
Local politics is shown to have significant impact on the eﬃciency of the long-
term care services in the Norwegian municipalities. Politically fragmented
authorities are relatively less eﬃcient than authorities where the political
responsibility is concentrated to few parties. Eﬃciency variations are also
related to political and administrative organization. However the influence
of party politics and political and administrative organization is found to
depend on the organization of the annual budget process.
1 Introduction
The public sector plays an important role in the provision of welfare services
in most countries. The eﬃciency of public sector provision has been a re-
curring issue in the literature for a long time. Monopoly provision and lack
of profit motive is seen to weaken the incentives to control costs resulting in
inferior performance of public providers as compared to private market pro-
vision. While the public versus private provision distinction has shown to be
important in explaining diﬀerences in production- or cost-eﬃciency in mar-
kets where both types of providers operate (Mueller 1989, ch. 14, Vining and
Boardman 1992) the approach is insuﬃcient to explain apparent diﬀerences
in performance among public providers.
Public sector provision is characterized by agency relations. Politicians
are elected to represent voter interests while public sector bureaucrats are
responsible of implementing the decisions taken by the politicians. Ineﬃ-
ciency can be linked to imperfect representation of interests. Starting with
the seminal contribution of Niskanen (1971) an extensive, mainly theoreti-
cal, literature on bureaucratic behavior has emerged. In Niskanen’s original
model the sponsor’s role in the public decision process was played down with
the power to control outcomes in the hands of the bureaucracy. Later exten-
sions have incorporated an active role for the sponsoring institution. Even
though the collective nature of the political decision making process some-
times is recognized (e.g. Miller and Moe 1983), the collective action problems
facing the legislature are mostly ignored in the bureaucracy literature in the
Niskanen tradition1. This paper addresses the implication of collective ac-
tion problems of political decision making for bureaucratic discretion and
provides an empirical analysis linking cost-eﬃciency of public service provi-
sion to political structure and institutions. The analysis also relates to the
growing literature on politico-institutional determinants of public spending
and budget deficits, linking loose fiscal policy to fragmented political and
budgetary institutions (see e.g. Poterba and von Hagen 1999).
The characteristic feature of public sector provision is that spending and
production decisions are taken within a political process involving negotia-
tions between diﬀerent political parties as well as between politicians and
bureaucrats. If addressed, the notion of bargaining between bureaucrats and
politicians is only made implicit in most models of bureaucratic supply. Here,
the bargaining approach is made explicit. The budget process is modeled as
a bargaining game between the politicians and the bureaucracy determining
1The collective action problems are addressed in the spatial voting literature, see e.g
Hill (1985) and Steunenberg (1996).
1
the level of eﬃciency and output. The approach is based on Kalseth (2000).
The advantage of the bargaining approach is that it allows bureaucratic in-
fluence on outcomes to vary, depending on the relative bargaining strength of
the politicians vis-à-vis the bureaucracy. The main idea behind the paper is
to link the relative bargaining strength of the politicians to collective action
problems associated with political fragmentation. Political fragmentation is
seen to weaken the bargaining position of the politicians. The outcome of the
bargaining game is also influenced by the institutional setting in which the
political and bureaucratic negotiations take place. A ‘bottom-up’ type bud-
get process gives the bureaucracy a first-mover advantage in the budgetary
game, the reverse is true with a ‘top-down’ type organization of the budget
process.
Empirical analyses of public sector eﬃciency based on models of bureau-
cratic supply are scarce, perhaps reflecting the limited focus on variation
among public providers in the theoretical literature. Duncombe and Miner
(1997) and Hayes et al. (1998) represent recent empirically oriented con-
tributions on local government eﬃciency. This paper provides an empirical
analysis of municipal service provision focusing on political determinants of
eﬃciency variation. The service under study is long-term care of elderly and
disabled people. Kalseth and Rattsø (1998) provides an analysis of admin-
istrative overspending based on a similar approach to the one taken here.
Long-term care comprises a range of services, from limited home based care
to full-scale institutional care. The bulk of studies assessing the eﬃciency
of long-term care services (typically US studies) are concentrated on spe-
cific services, such as nursing homes (e.g. Ozcan et al. 1998), area agencies
on aging (Ozcan and Cotter 1994) and deinstitutionalized care of develop-
mentally disabled (Dusansky and Wilson 1995), reflecting the (US) separate
organization of supply. In Norway the provision of long-term care is a public
sector responsibility, decentralized to the 435 municipalities. Thus the Nor-
wegian setting allows for an analysis of comparable institutions responsible
of providing the full range of long-term care services.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section the
bargaining approach is elaborated. The adaptation to the empirical analysis
of eﬃciency variation within long-term care is discussed in section 3. The
analysis of the eﬀect of political fragmentation on eﬃciency is presented in
section 4, while the influence of institutional arrangements is discussed in
section 5. In section 6 a test of the normality assumption underlying the
econometric model is presented. And finally section 7 concludes.
2
2 The bargaining model
The decision to spend on long-term care is ultimately taken by elected politi-
cians in the local council. The Norwegian municipalities are multi-purpose
authorities. Hence, the preferences of the political leadership can generally
be defined over the range of services provided by the municipality (long-term
care, primary education, kindergartens etc.)2. The income side of the mu-
nicipal budget is constrained by the central government control of the major
local revenue sources, grants and income tax revenue sharing. Thus the de-
cision problem facing the local decision-makers is to allocate the exogenous
revenues among the diﬀerent services. For a fixed total municipal budget the
benefit of increased spending on long-term care must be weighted against the
cost associated with the accompanying reduction in spending on other ser-
vices. To simplify the exposition we formulate the objective function of the
political leadership, or the political net benefit of long-term care, as follows:
NV = v(X)− q(B), vX> 0, vXX< 0, qB> 0, qBB> 0 (1)
whereX is the level of long-term care services produced andB is spending
on long-term care. The politicians benefit from production of long-term
care services (vX > 0). However budget appropriations necessary to finance
the production of services carry an opportunity cost, capturing the trade-
oﬀ between spending on long-term care and spending on other services and
the cost of raising additional funds3 (qB > 0). Higher exogenous municipal
revenue reduces the political cost of spending on long-term care.
Production responsibilities are decentralized to a service department. In
theories of bureaucracy in the Niskanen (1971) tradition public sector bureau-
crats are assumed to pursue their own goals, which, in at least some respects,
conflict with the goals of their superiors. In Niskanen’s original model the
bureaucrats are assumed to act as budget-maximizers exploiting their role as
service producers to extract consumer surplus. The budget maximization hy-
pothesis implies that output is produced at minimum costs when the solution
to the budget maximization problem is cost constrained. Cost-minimization
is not consistent with the pursuit of many of the utility enhancing activities
the bureaucrat is assumed to be engaged in. Following later extensions of the
2Due to the multi-dimensional nature of the local decision problem the link between
voter preferences and policy outcomes is blurred. In order not to complicate things too
much in the discussion of the bargaining set-up the political demand for services is assumed
to mirror the preferences of the political leadership (dominating party or the dominating
coalitions of parties) in the local council as in the dominant party model discussed by
Inman (1979).
3Reducing surpluses or increasing deficits is an option in the short run.
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Niskanen model the bureaucracy is assumed to have preferences for output
and slack, i.e. above minimum production costs (Migué and Bélanger 1974,
Niskanen 1975):
U = u(X,S), uX> 0, uXX< 0, uS> 0, uSS< 0 (2)
Migué and Bélanger (1974) defined slack as the discretionary budget,
i.e. the diﬀerence between the total budget and minimum production costs:
B−C(X), where C(X) is the minimum cost function. We define slack (S) as
the ratio of the budget to minimum production costs, i.e. S = B
C(X)
, which
comes closer to the concept of ineﬃciency to be analyzed empirically below.
This implies that the bureaucracy is concerned not with the absolute level
of discretionary resources available but rather the amount of discretionary
resources relative to the level of activity. If discretionary resources are not
exclusively consumed by the bureau head but also enjoyed by subordinates
this is a plausible assumption4.
The politicians are granted the power of making the final budget appropri-
ations. This does not however deny bureaucratic influence on the outcomes
of the local decision making process. It is common to separate between two
sources of bureaucratic discretion, authority-based and information-based
agenda control. The bureaucracy is responsible of preparing and providing
documentation serving as the foundation of political decision making. Fur-
thermore, the politicians depend on the bureaucracy to carry out politics.
Authority is delegated to the bureaucracy in both instances. Bureaucratic
expertise and complex working environments give the bureaucracy an infor-
mation advantage vis-à-vis the politicians. Taking into account the strategic
interaction of bureaucrats and politicians there is a wide range of possible
policy outcomes depending on the institutional setting in which the bud-
getary game takes place (Miller and Moe 1983, Moene 1986, and Chan and
Mestelman 1988).
Taking as the point of departure that the budget process involves negotia-
tions between the political leadership and the bureaucracy, and not imposing
pre-eminence of either of the parties at the outset, we assume that the local
decision making process can be described as a bargaining game. The bar-
gaining approach to the modeling of the relationship of politicians and bu-
reaucrats is applied earlier in e.g. Carroll (1993), Kalseth and Rattsø (1998),
Fuest (2000) and Kalseth (2000). We further assume that the outcome of the
4In Kalseth (2000) the production of the bureau’s services is assumed to be a function
of labor input and eﬀort and the preferences of the bureau are defined over output and
eﬀort. The definition of slack applied here is wider, including the notion of slack due to
low eﬀort levels.
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bargaining game is consistent with the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution.
In our case the Nash maximand reads:
Π = α log [u(X,S)− U0] + (1− α) log [v(X)− q(S · C(X))−NV0] (3)
The bargaining formulation is flexible in that it opens for the complete
dominance of either the political leadership or the bureaucracy as special
cases. The parameter α ∈ [0, 1] is interpreted as the relative bargaining
strength of the bureaucracy. U0 and NV0 represent the reservation utility
levels of the bureaucracy and the political leadership respectively, i.e. the
utility each of the parties obtain in case the negotiations break down.
Maximization of (3) with respect to S and X gives us the following first
order condition of the Nash bargaining game:
αUX [NV −NV0] + (1− α)NV X [U − U0] = 0 (4)
αUS [NV −NV0] + (1− α)NV S [U − U0] = 0
We see from equation (4) that in the Niskanen type case with all the
bargaining power in the hands of the bureaucracy (α = 1) the political net
benefit is set at its reservation level which in Niskanen’s model equals zero.
Likewise if the politicians fully determine policy outcomes (α = 0) they will
set output and slack such that the utility of the bureaucracy is just high
enough for continued cooperation. We also see that in the intermediate case
the marginal political net benefit of output is negative5. It is also evident
that the solution will be a point along the contract locus. The location on
the contract curve is determined by the relative bargaining strength of the
political leadership and the bureaucracy. The eﬀect on policy outcomes of
increased bargaining power of the bureaucracy is found by diﬀerentiating (4)
with respect to α:
dS
dα
=
1
D
[−ΠSαΠXX +ΠXαΠSX ] (5)
dX
dα
=
1
D
[−ΠXαΠSS +ΠSαΠSX ]
whereΠSα = US [U − U0]−1−NVS [NV −NV0]−1 > 0,ΠXα = UX [U − U0]−1−
NVX [NV −NV0]−1 > 0, and ΠSS < 0, ΠXX < 0 and D = ΠSSΠXX −
(ΠSX)2 > 0 follows from the 2. order condition of the maximization prob-
lem. The sign of dS
dα and
dX
dα is generally ambiguous depending on the relative
emphasis on slack and output on part of the bureaucracy and the relative
5NVX = vX − qB · CX · S and NVS = −qB · C (X) .
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cost of increasing slack and output to the politicians. If e.g. the bureau-
crat is a pure slack-maximizer (U = u(S)) as is sometimes assumed (e.g.
Hayes et al. 1998, Fuest 2000) then the prediction is clear: slack is increased
at the expense of reduced output as the bargaining strength of the bureau-
cracy increases. However in the more general case the bureaucracy may use
a strengthening of its bargaining power to push up both slack and output.
Rewriting (5) we get:
dS
dα
=
1
D
·
−α
1− α
(USUXX − UXUSX)
(U − U0)2
+
1− α
α
(NVSNVXX −NVXNVSX)
(NV −NV0)2
¸
dX
dα
=
1
D
·
−α
1− α
(UXUSS − USUSX)
(U − U0)2
+
1− α
α
(NVXNVSS −NVSNVSX)
(NV −NV0)2
¸
In the normal case both (USUXX − UXUSX) and (UXUSS − USUSX) is
negative. The term (NVXNVSS −NVSNVSX) = −vXqBBC(X)2−q2BC(X)CX
is negative. Then it follows from the quasiconcavity of the net benefit func-
tion of the politicians that (NVSNVXX −NVXNVSX) is positive. Thus in
the normal case a strengthening of the bargaining power of the bureaucracy
implies increased slack. The eﬀect on output is however uncertain.
The reservation, or disagreement, utility levels may be thought of as rep-
resenting the Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative game implied by the
structure of the annual budgetary process as in Kalseth (2000), and as sug-
gested in Chan and Mestelman (1988, p. 102). The organization of the
budgetary process imposes a certain structure on the bureau-sponsor rela-
tion. This can be represented as a non-cooperative game. Cooperation will
generally lead to outcomes preferred by both parties compared to the out-
come of playing the non-cooperative game6. If the political leadership and
the bureaucrat are unable to reach a negotiated agreement on the distribu-
tion of the benefits of cooperation then the solution to the budgetary game is
the one implied by the structure of the budget process. The non-cooperative
level of slack will typically be higher in a ‘bottom-up’ type budget process,
i.e. when the budget process is initiated by the bureaucracy announcing the
cost schedule before the politicians decide on the budget, than if the bud-
get process is organized as a ‘top-down’ process granting the politicians the
first-mover advantage (Kalseth 2000). The latter type budget process gives
the politicians a better position at the outset of the negotiations.
6The modeling in Kalseth (2000) takes into account the repeated nature of the bureau-
sponsor relation. The time preferences of the players constrain the Nash bargaining solu-
tion. Here we simplify by neglecting the time aspect, which is consistent with the players
fully discounting future outcomes.
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3 Empirical analysis of eﬃciency variation in
local government provision of long-term care
services
The bargaining model outlined above serves as the point of departure for
the empirical analysis of eﬃciency variations in local government provision
of long-term care services in Norway. The relative bargaining strength of
the politicians is linked to characteristics of the political system, notably
political fragmentation. The negotiation between the political leadership
and the service department takes place within varying institutional settings.
The influence of institutional arrangements on outcomes is also analyzed.
The municipalities’ performance within long-term care is assessed by use
of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). The DEA method provides eﬃciency
indices for each municipality based on relative performance compared to an
eﬃciency frontier defined by best-practice municipalities. Each municipality
is given an eﬃciency score in the range (0,1]. An eﬃciency score of e.g. 0.9 in-
dicates that the municipality in question can reduce its production costs by 10
percent without reducing the level of output produced. A score of 1 indicates
that the municipality is located at the best practice frontier. Eﬃciency scores
based on four diﬀerent output vectors are calculated (EﬀScore1-EﬀScore4).
The evaluation of relative performance will generally be aﬀected by the way
production is operationalized (Magnussen 1994). Thus experimenting with
diﬀerent ways of measuring output contributes to a check of the robustness
of the results. The data are obtained from the 1997 Nursing and care statis-
tics collected by Statistics Norway. The output and eﬃciency measures are
discussed in more detail in appendix A.
The eﬃciency scores resulting from the DEA analysis provide us with
an inverse proxy for slack. The bargaining model gives the eﬃciency level as
function of the relative bargaining strength of the political leadership vis-à-vis
the service department and factors aﬀecting the reservation utility levels of
the politicians and the bureaucracy as well as factors influencing the political
demand for long-term care and the preferences of the bureaucracy. In order to
reduce omitted variable biases in the analysis of observed eﬃciency variation
a set of control variables supposed to capture local preferences and cost
conditions is included along with the variables capturing the eﬀect of political
structure and institutions. The variables are documented in appendix B.
A considerable share of the observations on the eﬃciency variables, the
best practice municipalities, are clustered at the value 1. And furthermore,
we measure observed relative eﬃciency rather than actual eﬃciency. Thus,
the actual eﬃciency of the best practice municipalities is censored. This
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speaks in favor of using regression techniques handling censored data rather
than ordinary least square (OLS). Eﬃciency is estimated using the Tobit
method (Green 1993, chapter 22). The Tobit model with upper censoring
is defined as follows: y∗i = β
0xi + ui, ui ∼ N [0, 1] , where yi = 1 if y∗i ≥ 1
and yi = y∗i if y
∗
i < 1, and yi is the observed variable and y
∗
i is the latent or
censored variable.
The bargaining model opens for complex relationships between bargain-
ing strength, institutional arrangements and the set of control variables. A
simple linear approximation is used as the base line model. Alternative spec-
ifications are investigated. In section 5 the model is estimated allowing the
eﬀect of the variables to vary according to the type of budget process in
place.
The analysis is conducted in two rounds. First, three alternative measures
of bargaining strength are examined in section 4. Of the 397 municipalities
for which eﬃciency scores are calculated six have missing data on one or
more control variables and are excluded from the analysis, leaving us with
a sample of 391 municipalities in the first round of estimations. Next, in
section 5, the eﬀect of institutional arrangements is investigated. Due to
lack of information on the organizational variables for 94 of the municipalities
included in the original sample the analyses of political and administrative
organization cover only 297 municipalities.
4 Political fragmentation
The Norwegian local political system is characterized by multi-party rep-
resentation. After the 1995 election the number of parties (and non-party
groups) represented in the local council ranged from two to 10 with an av-
erage of six parties. Local politics is organized according to the ‘Board of
Aldermen’ model. That is, an executive board is elected by and from the
local council with proportional representation of the parties. Thus no party
or coalition of parties holds a formal ruling position, in contrast to a parlia-
mentary political system.
Majority-rule decision making by a political body characterized by multi-
party representation, heterogeneous policy platforms and amulti-dimensional
policy space entails collective action problems (Ordeshook 1997). As long as
no party holds a majority of the seats in the local council ’chaos’, i.e. vot-
ing cycles, is to be expected. Institutional constraints, logrolling, political
bargaining and coalition building may help to overcome the collective action
problems and create stable outcomes (Mueller 1989 ch. 5, Stratmann 1997).
The usual prediction of coalition theory is that minimum winning coalitions
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will be formed. However minimum winning coalitions are vulnerable to de-
fection. Oversized coalitions will produce more stable coalitions (Groseclose
and Snyder 1996). In the limit this amounts to the norm of universalism
(Weingast 1979, Tullock 1981).
The obstacles to political bargaining, coordination and commitment caused
by problems of collective action leave space open for bureaucratic maneuver-
ing. According to Moe (1997) the downside of legislative power is: “the
transaction costs and collective action problems that make it diﬃcult for
legislatures to take strong action on their own behalf and render them vul-
nerable to exploitation by others” (p. 480). Thus the bargaining power of
the politicians vis-à-vis the bureaucracy can be linked to the severity of the
collective action problem.
The severity of collective action problems within a voting body is likely
to be positively correlated with the number of decision makers. Coordinating
politics and agreeing on policy alternatives will typically be more demanding
the higher the number of decision makers, especially if there is a strive for
consensus as prescribed by the norm of universalism, in which case every
decision maker is a potential veto player. An increase in the number of veto
players reduces the ability of political action or change (Tsebelis 1999) and
increase agency discretion (Steunenberg 1996). The problem of free-riding
also increases with the number of decision makers. As long as policy deci-
sions are taken by, potentially shifting, coalitions the responsibility of policy
outcomes cannot be attributed to single decision makers7. The incentive to
control the bureaucracy weakens.
The system of joint rule embedded in the ‘Board of Aldermen’ system
is intended to enhance the division of power and responsibility between the
political parties, tending towards a norm of consensus. We expect the bar-
gaining power of the politicians vis-à-vis the bureaucracy to be weaker the
higher the number of parties, i.e. the more politically fragmented the local
council. Thus our measure of the relative bargaining strength is the number
of parties holding seat in the local council (NOP ). The measure relates to
Perotti and Kontopoulos’ (1998) notion of size fragmentation.
Two alternative, but related, measures of political fragmentation are also
examined. The eﬀective number of parties (ENOP ) takes into account that
the relative size of the party groups vary. If large party groups are more influ-
ential in the political negotiations than small party groups, then the eﬀective
number of parties may be a better representation of size fragmentation than
7Leyden and Borrelli (1995) found that the incumbent gubernatorial party was more
severely punished for bad economic conditions by the voters in gubernatorial elections
when the governor’s party controlled the state legislature than in the case of divided
government. See also the discussion in Roubini and Sachs (1989, p. 925-926).
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the actual number of parties. The eﬀective number of parties is calculated
as the inverse of the Herfindahl index:
ENOP =
·
P
p=1
SH2p
¸−1
(6)
where SH is the share of the seats held by party p. The Herfindahl index
was used to measure party fragmentation in Kalseth and Rattsø (1998).
If a single party holds a majority of the seats in the local council the de-
cision problem stemming from unstable majority constellations disappears.
A majority party is in a position to control, or dictate, policy decisions.
Thus one party majority is expected to represent a strong political leader-
ship and thus a strong bargaining position vis-à-vis the bureaucracy. The
second measure of political strength applied by Kalseth and Rattsø (1998)
is a classification of the political leadership, represented by the party of the
mayor and deputy mayor, according to the two dimensions majority/minority
and coalition/non-coalition leadership8:
COAL 1- Minority coalition
COAL 2- One party minority
COAL 3- Majority coalition
COAL 4- One party majority
The classification is inspired by the power dispersion, or ’strength-of-
government’, index adopted by Roubini and Sachs (1989). The Roubini and
Sachs index ranks the government according to coalition size, from one party
majority government being the strongest type of government via coalition
governments to a minority government representing the weakest type of gov-
ernment. A dummy variable formulation is used to allow for non-linearity of
the eﬀect of strength measured this way, taking into account the criticism of
the power dispersion index by Edin and Ohlsson (1991).
The results for the political strength variables are documented in table
1. Political fragmentation is clearly important in explaining variation in
eﬃciency in the provision of long-term care. Eﬃciency is negatively related to
the number of parties represented in the local council. The result is consistent
with our hypothesis that political fragmentation improves the bargaining
position of the bureaucracy. The bureaucracy exploits the collective action
problem facing the political leadership to increase slack. The estimates on
the eﬀect of NOP imply that one additional party being represented in the
local council reduces eﬃciency by 2-3 percentage points.
8See appendix B for more details.
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The two alternative measures of bargaining strength are also significantly
related to eﬃciency variations. A Wald test of the type of coalition variables
all being equal to zero is rejected at the 10 % level for three of the four
eﬃciency score variables. However, contrary to what we expected there are
no significant diﬀerences between one party majority and the rest. Rather
minority coalitions seem to stand out. For EﬀScore1 and 2 a significant diﬀer-
ence between two-party majority and two party minority coalitions is found.
For EﬀScore3 and 4 minority coalitions have significantly lower eﬃciency
levels than both two party majorities and one party minorities.
Table 1 Estimation results. Three measures of political strength1.
Model EﬀScore12 EﬀScore22 EﬀScore32 EﬀScore42
I NOP
-2.009
(-2.94)
-3.121
(-4.29)
-2.658
(-3.35)
-3.312
(-4.05)
II ENOP
-1.650
(-1.76)
-2.174
(-2.17)
-1.859
(-1.71)
-2.153
(-1.91)
III COAL13
-2.872
(-1.07)
-3.785
(-1.31)
-2.405
(-0.78)
-3.325
(-1.04)
COAL23
-0.385
(-0.14)
-0.875
(-0.30)
1.892
(0.612)
1.312
(0.41)
COAL33
1.193
(0.44)
0.258
(0.09)
2.229
(0.71)
1.208
(0.374)
Wald4 0.10 0.13 0.07 0.09
1 Results from three separate estimations for each EﬀScore measure. The results for
the full set of variables using NOP as the political strength variable is documented in
table A4 in appendix C. t-values in parentheses.
2 Eﬃciency score * 100.
3 One party majority serves as the reference group.
4 Wald test: COAL1=COAL2=COAL3=0. P-value reported.
The result is in line with the findings in Kalseth and Rattsø (1998). Mu-
nicipalities with minority coalitions are found to have higher administrative
overspending than other municipalities. The municipalities having minority
coalitions are on average more politically fragmented than the other munic-
ipalities. Further, neither the mayor nor the deputy mayor belong to the
largest party in more than 50 % of the minority coalition cases as opposed
to roughly 10 percent or less for the rest.
In case of one party majorities there may be a problem of separating
strength from ideology. The Labor Party is the majority party in 70 percent
of the cases. The Centre Party is the majority party in seven of the remain-
ing 10 one party majority cases. There are close connections between the
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Labor party and labor organizations in Norway. The Centre Party has also
been one of the strongest defenders of the public sector in debates on public
sector performance in recent years9. The Labor Party and perhaps also the
Centre Party may be more willing to trade eﬃciency for the loyalty of the
bureaucracy e.g. as voters.
The three measures of bargaining strength are interrelated. The number
of parties in the local council shows the strongest relationship with measured
eﬃciency10. This is in line with the norm of consensus associated with the
‘Board of Aldermen’ model allowing even minor parties to take part in the
policy formulation, however at the cost of profound collective action problems
making way for increased bureaucratic influence.
Similar measures of political fragmentation are applied in studies of the
eﬃciency of Belgian municipalities. Vanden-Eeckaut et al. (1993) groups the
municipalities according to three types of political majorities; strong (basi-
cally one party majority), dual (two party majority) and multiple majority.
They find that the share of ineﬃcient municipalities is lowest in the group
of strong majority and highest in the group of multiple majority. De Borger
et al. (1994) find a negative, however insignificant, eﬀect of the number of
parties in the municipal coalition11.
Two additional aspects of the composition of the local council are included
in the analysis. The share of seat of bourgeois parties (political centre and
right) (BOURG) is included to control for possible ideology eﬀects. While
the share of female representatives (WOMAN) is included to capture other
aspects of representation than party aﬃliation. The importance of ideology
(party color) for local government spending decisions is well documented in
the Norwegian case (Rattsø 1998). Kalseth and Rattsø (1998) find a posi-
tive relationship between share of socialist in the local council and admin-
istrative overspending. Traditionally the political right wing has been most
concerned with the level of eﬃciency within public sector service provision,
prone to be skeptical to public provision on ideological grounds. The share
of seats of bourgeois parties is found to have a significant positive eﬀect on
eﬃciency within long-term care when the Centre Party is not counted among
9In a recent survey the local politicians were asked to rank the challenges facing the
local governments. Only among the politicians from the Centre Party and a small left
wing party did eﬃciency not rank at the top of the list.
10When entering ENOP along with NOP in the estimation only NOP remains significant.
The same goes for the coalition type variables.
11The studies of the Belgian municipalities diﬀer from the one presented here in that
they evaluates the eﬃciency of the local governments as a whole implying that they must
rely on even more aggregated and imprecise measures of output than single service studies
typically do.
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the bourgeois camp, se table A4 in appendix C. This contrasts the findings
of De Borger et al. (1994). They find that municipalities dominated by lib-
erals tend to have a lower overall level of eﬃciency. However the results are
not readily comparable since they use a dummy variable for the presence of
liberals in the ruling coalition while we use the share of seats of the bourgeois
parties in the local council. The latter approach seems to be more appro-
priate in our case since the local political system in Norway enables parties
outside the ruling coalition to influence outcomes. The bourgeois dominated
councils are typically politically fragmented12. Thus the gain in eﬃciency
from bourgeois dominance tend to be oﬀset by collective action problems
worsening the bargaining position vis-à-vis the bureaucracy. No eﬀect of the
share of female representatives in the local council is found.
The results for the other control variables are quite robust over the four
alternative eﬃciency scores. However the results indicate that the output vec-
tor used to calculate EﬀScore4 probably best capture variation in caseloads
between the municipalities13. Thus in the proceeding only results based on
EﬀScore4 are reported.
5 Institutional arrangements
The bargaining between politicians and the bureaucracy takes place within
the context defined by institutional arrangements, first and foremost the or-
ganization of the annual budget process. The Local Government Act requires
that the final overall budget proposal, which is to be presented to and de-
cided upon by the local council, is prepared by the executive board. There are
however few restrictions on the organization of the early stages of the budget
process. Three models of organization of the annual budgetary process can
be identified from the database on municipal organization from which infor-
mation on institutional arrangements is collected: i) decentralized process,
ii) centralized administrative process, and iii) centralized political process. In
the decentralized process the annual budget process starts with the service
departments preparing a budget proposal for their respective departments.
The proposal is reviewed by the corresponding political committee. In the
next stage the chief administrative oﬃcer coordinates the proposals from the
committees and prepares a consolidated budget proposal which serves as the
starting point for the discussion in the executive board. In the centralized
administrative process the political committees are not involved in the first
12The correlation between bourgeois share and number of parties in the local council is
0.52.
13EﬀScore4 is less correlated with variables assumed to capture variation in caseloads.
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stages of the budget preparation. The chief administrative oﬃcer, in collab-
oration with the service departments, produces an overall budget proposal
which is submitted to the standing committees. The process then continues
with the executive board preparing the final budget proposal. Finally, in
the centralized political process the executive board initiates and directs the
process. The executive board prepares the budget proposal in collaboration
with the municipal administration through the chief administrative oﬃcer.
The final proposal is submitted to the standing committees and the local
council for final discussions and decision.
The decentralized process comes closest to a ‘bottom-up’ process and the
centralized political process resembles a ‘top-down’ process, as discussed in
section 2. The centralized administrative process looks like a compromise
between the decentralized and the centralized political process. We expect
the centralized political budget process to be associated with higher eﬃciency
levels than the centralized administrative and the decentralized process. Two
dummy variables ABUD and DBUD for centralized administrative and de-
centralized process respectively are constructed to capture the eﬀect of type
of budget process on eﬃciency.
The nature of the budgetary bargains, and hence final outcomes, is likely
to be influenced by the political and administrative organization in general.
Two additional characteristics of political and administrative organization
are investigated. The first is the organization of the standing committees.
The second relates to the organization of the administrative leadership.
Case preparation, proposition making and even decision authority is to
a large, however varying, extent decentralized to the executive board and
to diﬀerent standing committees. An important aspect of political decen-
tralization concerns who occupies the seats of the committees. We expect
fragmentation of decision-making to be higher the less overlap in member-
ship there is between the diﬀerent political bodies. Decision making is likely
to be more coordinated when the members of the executive board also hold
seats in the committees. Fragmented political organization is expected to
strengthen the bargaining position of the bureaucracy. An ordinal variable
(COMMEMB) ranging from 1 (all members of the executive board hold
seats in a committee) to 5 (non of the members of the executive board hold
seats in a committee) is included to capture the eﬀect of concentration of
decision making power14. The local governments have chosen diﬀerent mod-
els concerning the nature of the authority delegated to the committees. The
eﬀect of membership overlap may depend on the type of model in place. Two
types of standing committees are identified in the database on municipal or-
14See appendix B for more details.
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ganization. The first type has authority to make final decisions on matters
delegated to the committee. The committee may also be granted the right
to make proposals to the executive board and/or the local council. The sec-
ond type of committee resembles parliamentary committees and is delegated
authority to prepare and make proposals on cases, which are to be handled
by the local council. A dummy variable (COMTY PE) is constructed taking
the value of one if the committee system is said to be of the latter type.
Finally, we also include a variable reflecting the organization of the ad-
ministrative leadership. The variable (ADMTEAM) takes on a value of one
if the chief administrative oﬃcer and the heads of the service departments
constitute an administration team acting in concert. The motivation for in-
cluding the variable is that both the preferences and the bargaining position
of the heads of the service departments may be aﬀected by operating within
a management team. We expect administration teams to be associated with
higher eﬃciency levels.
The analysis of the impact of organization on eﬃciency is not unproblem-
atic due to potential endogeneity biases. An instrumental variable approach
is preferable. However proper instruments are hard to find. Factors aﬀecting
the choice of institutional arrangements are also likely to influence eﬃciency.
The control for political structure (NOP , BOURG, WOMAN) and other
control variables possibly correlated with both organization and eﬃciency
probably reduces the problem of endogeneity biases. Table 2 below reports
the results for the organizational variables analyzed.
Table 2 Estimation results.
Political and administrative organization1.
DBUD2 -0.901 (-0.41)
ABUD2 -1.901 (-0.90)
COMTYPE -13.741 (-2.55)
COMMEMB -1.28 (-1.95)
TYPE*MEMB 4.061 (2.71)
ADMTEAM 1.185 (0.66)
1 EﬀScore4*100. N=297. Full model not reported.
t-values in parentheses.
2 Centralized political budget process serves as the reference group.
The results reveal no significant relationship between type of budget pro-
cess and the level of eﬃciency. Nor is eﬃciency found to be related to our
measure of the organization of the administrative leadership. The organi-
zation of the standing committees seems to matter when we allow for in-
teraction eﬀect between COMTY PE and COMMEMB. The eﬀect of the
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degree of overlap in membership of the executive board and the committees
is conditional on the type of committee system in place. For municipalities
having delegated decision making authority to the standing committees a
lowering of the share of the members of the executive board holding seat in
a standing committee reduces eﬃciency as suggested above. However this is
not the case when the committees are of the type of parliamentary commit-
tees. Having a parliamentary type committee system seems to imply lower
eﬃciency than a committee system with decentralized decision making au-
thority, however only when the members of the executive board also take part
in the work of the committees. The interaction term is positive suggesting
that non-overlap in membership in the executive board and the committees
contributes to improve eﬃciency for municipalities having adopted a parlia-
mentary type model. Since there are relatively few municipalities having the
latter type of committee system the estimates are less reliable.
Table 3 Estimation results by type of budget process.1
Centralized pol Centralized adm Decentralized
BOURG
0.183
(1.70)
0.083
(0.69)
0.102
(0.99)
WOMAN
0.057
(0.29)
0.071
(0.39)
0.403
(2.62)
NOP
-5.779
(-3.39)
-1.109
(-0.68)
0.868
(0.74)
COMTYPE
-14.59
(-2.01)
0.221
(0.02)
-19.26
(-0.91)
COMMEMB
-1.056
(-1.01)
-1.742
(-1.51)
-1.007
(-1.28)
TYPE*MEMB
4.961
(2.39)
0.350
(0.12)
5.517
(1.07)
ADMTEAM
-1.786
(-0.61)
9.171
(3.04)
-3.098
(-1.15)
# obs 133 86 78
1 EﬀScore4*100. Full model not reported. t-values in parentheses.
Even though the results reveal no significant diﬀerences in the level of ef-
ficiency related to the structure of the budget process the budget procedure
may still be of importance since it alters the roles of the participants in the
budgetary game. Thus the eﬀect of the other explanatory variables may be
conditional on the budgetary procedure. Table 3 reports the results of sepa-
rate estimations for municipalities having a decentralized process, centralized
administrative process and centralized political budget process respectively.
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The results reveal an interesting pattern. Party politics, measured by party
color and party fragmentation, and political organization contribute signifi-
cantly to eﬃciency variations in the centralized political process but not in
the centralized administrative and the decentralized process. The adminis-
trative organization variable has a strong positive eﬀect in the centralized
administrative process. While a higher share of female representatives is
associated with higher eﬃciency with the decentralized budget process.
The observed pattern is consistent with an interpretation stressing the
importance of the early stages of the budgetary process. In the decentralized
process the first stages of the budget process involve the service departments
and the political committees. The politicians are often said to be elected
to the committees on basis of special knowledge or field of interest, or they
develop special knowledge and interest as a consequence of committee mem-
bership. If so, then characteristics other than party aﬃliation, such as sex15,
may be important in explaining behavior. The variation in the political orga-
nization variables is too limited to get precise estimates in the decentralized
case. The political level is not involved in the early stages of the budget
preparation in the centralized administrative process. This may hamper or
weaken political influence on outcomes. Rather administrative organization
becomes important. The eﬀect of having an integrated administrative leader
team is to increase eﬃciency by almost 10 percentage points. Political struc-
ture and party politics become important when the budget process is initiated
and coordinated by the executive board. The eﬀect of political fragmentation
is substantial. If one additional party is represented in the local council the
eﬃciency is reduced by nearly six percentage points.
The results reported in table 2 and 3 indicate that the potential ad-
vantages of political control of the budget process are lost due to political
fragmentation. The chief administrative oﬃcer and service-oriented politi-
cians may represent stronger opponents in the bargaining with the service
department than a fragmented executive board.
6 Test of the normality assumption
The results reported so far indicate that political structure and institutions do
play a significant role in determining the level of eﬃciency within municipal
service production. The results are obtained by use of the Tobit model.
The consistency of the Tobit estimator preconditions that the underlying
distribution is normal. The assumption of normally distributed disturbances
15Sex is seen as a proxy for other underlying factors, such as position in the labor market,
influencing preferences.
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is tested by use of the conditional moments test described in Green (1993, ch.
22). The test is carried out by running a linear regression of the third and
fourth moment on the first order conditions and a constant term to test for
symmetry (skewness) and the degree of excess (kurtosis) respectively. The
null of normally distributed residuals is rejected if a t test of the constant
terms being zero is rejected. Table 4 reports the results from the test.
Table 4 Conditional moment test of normality1.
All Centralized pol Centralized adm Decentralized
Skewness
-5.631
(0.000)
-4.140
(0.000)
-2.430
(0.018)
-3.887
(0.000)
Kurtosis
-4.804
(0.000)
-3.140
(0.002)
-4.236
(0.000)
-0.921
(0.362)
# obs 297 133 86 78
1 EﬀScore4. t-values. P-values in parentheses.
The symmetry assumption is clearly rejected both for the full sample and
when the municipalities are separated according to type of budget process.
Further zero excess is rejected except for the sample of municipalities having
a decentralized budget process. The normality assumption thus seem to be
violated in our case.
Table 5 Estimation results.
Generalized Logistic Tobit model1.
BOURG 0.166 (2.30)
WOMAN 0.013 (0.14)
NOP -2.139 (-2.52)
DBUD 4.347 (2.11)
ABUD -0.157 (-0.08)
COMTYPE -8.594 (-1.65)
COMMEMB -1.202 (-1.96)
TYPE*MEMB 2.170 (1.45)
ADMTEAM 0.303 (0.17)
Theta 6.106 (3.06)
Wald2 0.01
1 EﬀScore4*100. N=297. Full model not reported.
t-values in parentheses.
2 Wald test for symmetry: Theta=1. P-value reported.
In order to assess the robustness of our results to alternative distributions
we reestimated the model using a Generalized Logistic Tobit model as de-
scribed in Green (1998, p. 690). The Logistic distribution allows for thicker
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tails than the Normal distribution. The Generalized Logistic distribution
also allows for asymmetry. The number of observations is too small to get
reliable results for the three subsamples. Thus the check of results is per-
formed for the model with dummy variables for the type of budget process16.
The results are documented in table 5. The rejection of the symmetry as-
sumption is confirmed in the Generalized Logistic Tobit model as can be seen
from the reported p-value of the Wald statistic. The estimated eﬀects are
quite robust to the altering of the assumption of the underlying distribution.
The exception is the eﬀect of having a decentralized budgetary process. In
the Generalized Logistic Tobit model the estimated eﬀect of decentralization
is to increase eﬃciency.
7 Concluding remarks
Local politics is shown to have significant impact on eﬃciency within long-
term care in the Norwegian municipalities. Politically fragmented authorities
are relatively less eﬃcient than authorities where the political responsibility
is divided among few parties. We interpret this result as fragmented local
councils being in a weaker bargaining position towards the bureaucracy. Ef-
ficiency variations are also found to be related to political and administrative
organization.
However the influence of party politics and political and administrative
organization depend on the organization of the annual budget process. Party
politics, i.e. ideology and party fragmentation, only seem to matter when
the executive board is involved in all stages of the drafting of the municipal
budget. When the budget process starts at the level of each service depart-
ment, with the service department and the corresponding political committee
preparing the first draft of the department’s budget, party politics seems to be
played down. The third model of organization of the budget process excludes
political participation in the early stages of the process. The initial budget
preparation is controlled by the chief administrative oﬃcer. This seems to
weaken the political influence on outcomes. Administrative organization on
the other hand is found to be important in this case.
16An ordered probit estimation of the model, where the observations are grouped ac-
cording to the level of eﬃciency, is also tried. The ordered probit estimation reproduces
the results of the Tobit model for the full sample. The eﬀect of committee type weakens
and becomes insignificant in the analysis of the centralized political budget process. This
is also the case for the share of female representatives in the analysis of the decentralized
budget process. Otherwise the results hold using ordered probit estimation for the three
subsamples.
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Appendix A: Measuring output and eﬃciency
In order to evaluate the municipalities’ performance within long-term care
we need a measure of output. Measuring output within long-term care is not
straightforward. The output may be conceptualized as improved health sta-
tus, improved capability of managing every day living or improved quality
of life. Conditions which all are hard to measure. If quality of services are
constant and the recipients are homogenous in needs, one possible approx-
imation to long-term care production is the number of people served. In
most studies of nursing home eﬃciency output is measured as the number of
patients or the number of patient days for diﬀerent groups of patients that
are supposed to be relatively homogenous. The output measure in this study
is also based on the number of recipients. The users of long-term care are
however highly heterogeneous. If this is not taken into account the output
measure will be biased, favoring authorities with a light caseload. Hetero-
geneity can be taken into account by allowing multiple outputs. However
some sort of aggregation is necessary if the number of outputs is to be man-
ageable. Thus, quality aside, the problem lies in defining a vector of outputs
that capture diﬀerences in case-mix between the municipalities, and that at
the same time comprise a manageable number of outputs.
Four output vectors are defined. The first (Output1) aggregates the total
number of users according to age and mode of care into five output categories;
three groups according to age for home care (age 0-66, age 67-79, and age
80 years and more) and two groups according to age for institutionalized
care (age 0-79, and age 80 years and more)17. The second output vector
(Output2) includes the same output categories as Output1 however adding
the number of users of home care receiving an amount of help equivalent to
a full man-year or more. This output variable is added to capture the high
costs faced by the municipalities with a relative high share of users of home
care demanding very high levels of care. The users receiving such high levels
of care are typically persons with severe physical or mental disabilities18. The
third output vector (Output3) utilizes the information on the type of services
that the users of home care receive. The users of home care are divided into
three groups; those receiving (only) home nursing, those receiving (only)
17Young users and users living in institutions receive considerably more help than old
users and users receiving home care respectively (Kalseth and Magnussen 1995).
18In 1991 the primary responsibility for providing long-term care services to mentally
challenged persons with comprehensive needs was transferred from the counties to the
municipalities. After the reform the clients was to be transferred back to the municipality
where they where born. However, about 50 percent of the clients that were living in the
former institutions continued to live in the municipality where the institution was located
(the ’host-municipality’) after the reform (St.prp. nr. 1 (1995-96)).
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practical assistance19 and those receiving both types of services. In order to
keep the number of outputs down we only operate with two age categories
for each of the three groups; 0-66 and above 66 years of age, giving us a total
of 8 user groups. And again the last output vector (Output4) is identical to
Output3 except for the addition of the number of users demanding very high
levels of home care20.
Unfortunately, we do not have any information on the quality of the
services produced. Thus if increasing the quality of care is costly, there
may be a danger present of confusing variation in quality with variation
in eﬃciency. However studies of user satisfaction with the municipalities’
long-term care services do not indicate any strong systematic relationship
between user satisfaction and indicators of resource use (Dræge el al. 1997)
or eﬃciency (Erlandsen et al. 1997)21.
The municipalities’ performance within long-term care are assessed by use
of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). DEA is a non-parametric linear pro-
gramming technique that can be employed to assess relative eﬃciency among
decision-making units (DMUs). The method is based on the work of Charnes
et al. (1978) generalizing the measure of technical eﬃciency proposed by
Farrell (1957). The DEA method handles easily multi-output/multi-input
production, which is often the case in public service production and it does
not require any assumptions about functional form. An underlying assump-
tion in the DEA analysis is that all observations are part of the production
possibility set implying that the boundary of the production possibility set is
deterministic. The DEA method establishes a reference frontier consisting of
best practice observations to which all the other DMUs are compared. The
performance of each unit is assessed by comparison with other similar units.
The reference frontier is established by a linear piecewise envelopment of the
observations. Furthermore the production possibility set is convex, i.e. con-
vex combinations of observed input-output combinations are attainable. The
identification of eﬃcient DMUs depends on the assumption of technology ap-
plied. Here we assume variable return to scale technology. Each municipality
is given an eﬃciency score in the range (0,1]. An eﬃciency score of e.g. 0.9
19Assistance and training in managing activities of daily living.
20The disaggregation of the users according to the criteria discussed above is an attempt
to reduce biases stemming from diﬀerences in caseloads. Since our treatment of the het-
erogeneity problem is quite rough substantial biases may still be present. In the analysis
of eﬃciency variations we therefore include several variables that are supposed to capture
diﬀerences in caseloads.
21We have access to measures of uncovered needs for a small subset of the municipalities
included in the eﬃciency analysis. The data reveal no systematic relationship between
uncovered needs and the calculated eﬃciency scores for these municipalities.
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indicates that the municipality in question can reduce its factor-input use by
10 percent without reducing the level of output produced. A score of 1 indi-
cates that the municipality in question is located at the best practice frontier.
The performance is thus evaluated according to the input-saving potential.
See e.g. Seiford and Thrall (1990) for a review of the DEA approach.
Due to poor quality of the data on personnel use within long-term care
we apply the dual to technical input eﬃciency viz. cost eﬃciency (Färe and
Primont 1988, 1996). Thus a cost eﬃcient reference frontier is established de-
fined by the municipalities having the lowest costs given their output levels22.
This approach is also taken in previous studies evaluating the performance
of local governments, e.g. Vanden-Eeckaut et al. (1993) for Belgian munic-
ipalities and Athanassopoulos and Triantis (1998) for Greek municipalities.
About 10 percent of the municipalities are excluded from the analysis due
to poor data quality on the users of long-tern care23. The results from the
DEA analysis is documented in table A1.
Table A1 Eﬃciency scores using DEA analysis1. N=397.
Mean Std. dev. Minimum Maximum % Eﬀ=1
EﬀScore1 0.754 0.141 0.430 1.000 8.1
EﬀScore2 0.793 0.134 0.460 1.000 12.1
EﬀScore3 0.805 0.140 0.472 1.000 17.1
EﬀScore4 0.837 0.132 0.475 1.000 21.7
1 EﬀScorei is based on output vector Outputi, i=1,..,4.
The average eﬃciency score is in the range of 0.75 to 0.84, implying that
on average the municipalities can reduce their costs by 15 to 25 percent with-
out any reduction in activity. An increase in the number of dimensions (here
number of outputs) typically increases the average eﬃciency score since it
increases the heterogeneity among the municipalities. The share of the mu-
nicipalities classified as eﬃcient increases from 8 percent with output vector
1 to 22 percent with output vector 4. The wide variation in measured cost-
22Production costs are defined as the sum of net salaries and social expenses; other
running expenses; net transfers to counties and ‘others’; and net internal transfers. Source:
Municipal accounts. Norwegian social science data services.
23In addition to municipalities with incomplete data we have excluded municipalities
where the number of users changed with more than 30 percent from the previous year
(1996). Large changes in the number of users can to a large extent be explained by poor
routines in reporting data to Statistics Norway. Even though the large change in the
number of users is real it may create problem in the eﬃciency analysis if the changes
occurred late in the year. This because the output data is based on a counting of the
numbers of user receiving services at the end of the year while the input measure reflects
resource use throughout the entire year.
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eﬃciency between the municipalities is likely to reflect problems in capturing
variations in caseloads adequately.
Table A2 Correlation matrix of the eﬃciency scores. Spearman’s rho.
EﬀScore1 EﬀScore2 EﬀScore3 EﬀScore4
EﬀScore1 1.000
EﬀScore2 0.856 1.000
EﬀScore3 0.894 0.809 1.000
EﬀScore4 0.746 0.900 0.885 1.000
The rank correlation coeﬃcient, see table A2, indicates that even though
the four output vectors do rank the municipalities roughly in the same way,
which output vector is used aﬀects the evaluation of some of the municipali-
ties.
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Appendix B: Documentation of the variables
Description of the variables.
Variable Description
NOP Number of parties (and non-party groups).
ENOP Eﬀective number of parties (See eq. 6).
COAL1 Minority coalition - the mayor and deputy mayor represent diﬀerent parties and the
two parties together hold less than 50 % of the seats in the local council.
COAL2 One party minority - the mayor and deputy mayor represent the same party and this
party hold less than 50 % of the seats in the local council.
COAL3 Majority coalition - the mayor and deputy mayor represent diﬀerent parties and the
two parties together hold more than 50 % of the seats in the local council.
COAL4 One party majority - the mayor and deputy mayor represent the same party and this
party hold more than 50 % of the seats in the local council.
BOURG Percentage of the representatives from the Progress party (Fremskrittspartiet), the
Conservative party (Høyre), The Left (Venstre), and the Christian democratic party
(Kristelig Folkeparti).
WOMEN Percentage of female representatives in the local council.
DBUD Dummy equal 1 if decentralized budget process (see section 5).
ABUD Dummy equal 1 if centralized administrative budget process (see section 5).
COMMEMB The share of the members of the executive board being member of a standing com-
mittee. 1=all ,2=more than 75 %, 3=25-75 %, 4=1-25 %, 5=none.
COMTYPE Dummy equal 1 if the standing committees mainly is of the form of parliamentary
committees (see section 5).
TYPE*MEMB COMTYPE*COMMEMB
ADMTEAM Dummy equal 1 if the chief administrator and the heads of the service departments
constitute an integrated administration team (see section 5).
Continued.
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Description of the variables continued.
Variable Description
MunicInc Tax revenues and grants per capita (In 1000 NOK).
PrivInc After-tax income per capita (In 1000 NOK).
Unempl Unemployment rate. Percentage in population 16-66 years.
Singlepar Percentage of families receiving child benefits being single parent families.
Child Percentage of population aged 0-6 years.
Young Percentage of population aged 7-15 years.
Elderly Percentage of population aged 67 years or more.
Old Percentage of elderly population aged 80 years or more.
Mortalily Mortality per 100 000 inhabitant, yearly average 1990-1994. Standardized for the age-
and sex composition of the population.
Disabled Percentage of population 16-67 years being disabled.
Alone Percentage of population above 79 years non-married, divorced or widowed.
FemWork Female work participation rate. Percentage of female population 20-66 years.
MentChall Percentage of population being mentally challenged.
HostMunic Municipalities hosting institutions for mentally challenged persons prior to the reform
in 1991.
Distance Average traveling distance (in minutes) to the center of the municipality.
Rural Percentage of population living in rural areas with less than 200 inhabitants.
Mono Indeks of centricity. Mono=
P
k
(Fk
F
)2, F=total number of people living in population
centers with more than 200 inhabitants, Fk=number of people living in population
centre k. Mono ² [0, 1]
Pop Population size (/1000).
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Table A3 Descriptive statistics. N=391.
Variable Mean Std.dev Min Max
NOP 6.1 1.5 3 10
ENOP 4.0 1.0 1.8 7.1
COAL1 0.44 0.50 0 1
COAL2 0.21 0.41 0 1
COAL3 0.26 0.44 0 1
COAL4 0.09 0.28 0 1
BOURG 31.8 17.8 0 79.3
WOMAN 32.3 8.1 10.5 56.5
DBUD (N=297) 0.26 0.44 0 1
ABUD (N=297) 0.29 0.45 0 1
COMMEMB (N=297) 2.66 1.52 1 5
COMTYPE (N=297) 0.17 0.38 0 1
TYPE*MEMB (N=297) 0.56 1.40 0 5
ADMTEAM (N=297) 0.51 0.50 0 1
MunicInc 22.4 7.1 14.8 79.0
PrivInc 97.0 13.5 68.8 166.0
Unempl 3.3 1.5 0.6 10.7
Singlepar 15.3 4.8 2.7 36.2
Child 9.4 1.2 6.8 14.0
Young 11.8 1.4 8.8 15.9
Elderly 15.8 3.6 6.6 29.8
Old 30.4 4.5 17.8 49.0
Mortalily 929.3 128.3 494 1490
Disabled 9.0 2.6 3.4 18.7
Alone 71.1 4.9 51.4 88.1
FemWork 63.2 5.0 48.5 81.7
MentChall 0.5 0.3 0 4.0
HostMunic 0.08 0.27 0 1
Rural 55.5 28.7 0.6 100.0
Distance 13.9 11.0 0.9 106.8
Mono 0.63 0.35 0 1
Pop 9.0 16.9 0.6 224.3
The DEA analysis covers 397 of the 435 Norwegian municipalities (1997).
Six municipalities included in the DEA analysis (see Appendix A) is excluded
due to missing data on the control variables. Further 94 municipalities lack
data on some or all of the variables describing institutional arrangements.
Data Sources: Statistics Norway and Norwegian Social Science Data Services’
(NSD) databank of social, economic, demographic and political variables
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describing each municipality. Data on the users of nursing and care services
is also collected from this databank. The data on political and administrative
organization is also provided by NSD. NSD is not responsible for the analysis
of the data used or the interpretations made.
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Appendix C: Selected estimation results
A4 Estimation results. N=391. t-values in parentheses.
EﬀScore11 EﬀScore21 EﬀScore31 EﬀScore41
MunicInc
-0.332
(-2.37)
-0.357
(-2.41)
-0.284
(-1.77)
-0.296
(-1.79)
PrivInc
-0.109
(-1.30)
-0.044
(-0.49)
-0.144
(-1.49)
0.096
(-0.97)
Unempl
1.212
(1.68)
1.695
(2.21)
1.335
(1.60)
1.503
(1.74)
Singlepar
-0.410
(-1.73)
-0.319
(-1.27)
-0.363
(-1.33)
-0.295
(-1.05)
Child
-0.201
(-0.23)
-0.527
(-0.58)
-0.965
(-0.98)
-1.321
(-1.30)
Young
-0.906
(-1.23)
-1.023
(-1.31)
-0.444
(-0.53)
-0.811
(-0.93)
Elderly
0.457
(1.15)
0.215
(0.51)
-0.052
(-0.11)
-0.285
(-0.61)
Old
0.654
(3.10)
0.669
(2.99)
0.608
(2.50)
0.503
(2.01)
Mortality
0.017
(2.33)
0.015
(1.96)
0.011
(1.33)
0.010
(1.18)
Disabled
-0.088
(-0.22)
-0.092
(-0.22)
0.043
(0.09)
0.050
(0.11)
Alone
0.211
(1.48)
0.071
(0.47)
0.225
(1.38)
0.065
(0.70)
FemWork
-0.083
(-0.42)
-0.0005
(-0.00)
-0.134
(-0.60)
-0.043
(-0.19)
MentChall
-12.072
(-4.89)
-2.524
(-0.95)
-9.031
(-3.18)
-1.087
(-0.36)
HostMunic
-2.503
(-0.85)
2.153
(0.68)
-0.761
(-0.22)
5.155
(1.44)
Rural
-0.011
(-0.23)
-0.005
(-0.11)
0.00005
(0.00)
0.019
(0.34)
Distance
0.132
(1.85)
0.152
(2.01)
0.217
(2.50)
0.209
(2.29)
Mono
-3.817
(-1.51)
0.649
(0.24)
1.000
(0.33)
4.794
(1.50)
Pop
0.786
(2.91)
0.973
(3.26)
1.487
(3.78)
1.580
(3.76)
Continued
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EﬀScore11 EﬀScore21 EﬀScore31 EﬀScore41
Rural*Pop
0.005
(0.86)
0.011
(1.83)
0.002
(0.34)
0.005
(0.67)
Distance*Pop
-0.015
(-1.59)
-0.019
(-1.99)
-0.020
(-1.47)
-0.017
(-1.16)
Mono*Pop
-0.194
(-0.80)
-0.348
(-1.29)
-0.819
(-2.31)
-0.981
(-2.58)
BOURG
0.10
(1.90)
0.134
(2.41)
0.127
(2.10)
0.152
(2.44)
WOMAN
0.79
(0.92)
0.021
(0.23)
0.075
(0.76)
0.017
(0.17)
NOP
-2.009
(-2.94)
-3.121
(-4.29)
-2.658
(-3.35)
-3.312
(-4.05))
Constant
65.765
(2.11)
72.593
(2.20)
86.206
(2.40)
101.219
(2.75)
σ
12.541
(26.41)
13.226
(25.52)
14.301
(24.57)
14.591
(23.68)
Log-L -1462.603 -1429.843 -1399.404 -1344.495
1 EﬀScore*100
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Abstract
Decentralization of important welfare services to the local government sector
introduces a tension between local discretion to adjust to voter preferences
and central government concern for horizontal equity. This paper takes ad-
vantage of a unique dataset for the Norwegian long-term care services to
study whether the local governments diﬀer in their choice of service stan-
dards. The discussion focuses on the equalizing properties of the centralized
system of financing of the local government sector in Norway. Restriction
of local taxation and the system of intergovernmental grants are intended to
secure equalization of ’economic opportunities’ and enable the local govern-
ments to provide uniform service levels. A multilevel modeling approach is
applied in the empirical analysis. The results show a positive relationship
between municipal income and client care levels, indicating that the cen-
tralized system of financing fails to achieve full tax and expenditure needs
equalization. The results also indicate varying local priorities with regard to
service levels within long-term care.
1 Introduction
A characterizing feature of the Norwegian welfare state is decentralization of
responsibilities to the local government sector. Major welfare services such as
schooling, health care and care of the elderly and the disabled are taken care
of at the local level. About 60 percent of total public consumption is found
within the counties and the municipalities (NOU 1997: 8). The economic
rationale for decentralization of public responsibilities to local governments
is to secure eﬃcient allocation of resources as summarized in the decentral-
ization theorem (Oates 1972). Decentralization allows local governments to
adjust to local costs and preferences, which may produce welfare gains com-
pared to standardized national solutions. However the variation in service
levels between the local governments following full local freedom to tax and
spend may come at odds with the distributional goals of the welfare state.
This has been a recurring issue in the Norwegian debate of local govern-
ment autonomy. Decentralization of important welfare services introduces a
tension between local discretion to adjust to voter preferences and central
government concern for horizontal equity (Borge and Rattsø 1998).
Decentralization gains are achieved by allowing variation in local spending
levels. Variation in the local governments’ per capita spending within a given
service sector can be decomposed according to source of variation: demand,
coverage, production costs and service standards1. The demand for services is
related to socio-demographics such as the age-composition of the population
and is generally exogenous to the local government. Production costs are also
partly outside the local government control. Population size and settlement
pattern aﬀect production costs through scale economics and constrains put
on organization of activities. Cost-eﬃciency, coverage and service standards
on the other hand are subject to local government discretion. Local discretion
is exercised within the limits set by the local financial capacity and central
government regulations.
From the central government’s point of view there is an important distinc-
tion between variation in service levels due to varying local conditions and
variation due to diﬀerences in local priorities. If the central government’s aim
is to achieve equalization of service levels across the country, then variation
1Per capita spending can be decomposed as follows: SPENDINGjPOP =
POPj
POP × USERSjPOPj ×
SPENDINGj
SERV ICESj
× SERV ICESjUSERSj , where SPENDINGj is total spending within service sector
j, POP is population size, POPj is the size of the target population of service j, USERSj
is the number of peoples served, and SERV ICESj is the level of services produced. Then
the first term on the right hand side expresses the demand for service j, the second term is
the coverage ratio, the third term captures unit costs, and the last term gives the (average)
service standard.
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in local conditions can be equalized by use of diﬀerent financial instruments,
while varying local priorities demand central regulation of service levels. The
latter is, in the extreme, equivalent to centralization of responsibilities.
The Norwegian central government uses several instruments to constrain
local government discretion, including various regulations on service stan-
dards and accessibility2. On the financial side the local governments are
heavily restricted in their autonomy in taxation3. Due to variation in tax
bases and socio-demographic conditions, constraining local discretion to tax
is not suﬃcient to enable the local governments to oﬀer uniform service lev-
els. Thus the central government co-finance the local governments through
a grant system. The grant system is intended to secure equalization of ’eco-
nomic opportunities’ and combines tax equalization with expenditure needs
equalization based on objective criteria. The expenditure need equalization
part of the grant system is said to fully compensate for variation in demand
and involuntary cost factors4.
Even though the centralized system of financing curtails local autonomy
on the revenue side the local authorities still have discretion in setting pri-
orities regarding the composition of services. Furthermore the grant system
does not fully equalize tax revenue diﬀerences between the local authorities.
Thus, despite the equalization ambitions of the central government, there
are relatively huge diﬀerences in local spending patterns. To illustrate, the
budget share of primary education varied from 0,18 to 0,44 and the budget
share of primary health care, social services and long-term care varied from
0,21 to 0,60 in 1996 (NOS C 475).
Previous Norwegian studies in the field of local public finance (e.g. Rattsø
1989, Borge and Rattsø 1995) have analyzed determinants of variation in
per capita spending and budget shares of diﬀerent services between the mu-
nicipalities, relating spending variation to diﬀerences in local economic and
structural conditions. The importance of municipal income (per capita grants
and tax revenues) in explaining variation in spending patterns is well docu-
mented. Increased municipal income generally increases the spending levels
in all service sectors. However, the income elasticities vary considerably.
Borge and Rattsø (1995) reports long-run Engel elasticities in the range of
0,7 for primary education to 1,9 for childcare.
2E.g. primary education is compulsory, and everybody is entitled to secondary educa-
tion.
3Income tax and wealth tax are the major tax revenue sources. The local discretion in
setting tax rates are limited to a narrow band and all municipalities uses the maximum
rate.
4This of course depends on how well the criteria used to calculate expenditure needs
reflects actual demand and cost conditions.
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Due to the compounding sources of variation in per capita spending, dif-
ferences in spending levels between the local governments do not necessarily
imply diﬀerences in service levels oﬀered to clients with identical needs. This
paper takes advantage of a unique dataset for the Norwegian long-term care
services to study whether the local governments diﬀer in their choice of ser-
vice standards. The impact of the centralized system of financing of the local
government sector in Norway is analyzed by the eﬀect of municipal income
on client care levels.
The responsibility of providing long-term care services lies within the 435
municipalities. They are charged with oﬀering the full range of services,
from home based care, such as home-help and home-nursing, to full scale in-
stitutionalized care in nursing homes. The municipalities are multi-purpose
authorities. Besides long-term care the municipalities also organize primary
education, kindergartens, primary health care, social services, culture and in-
frastructure. Long-term care accounted for 1/4 of total current expenditures
in 19965. The municipalities’ expenditures within the long-term care services
amounted to 6,900 NOK per capita, adding up to a total of 30 billion NOK.
This is about the same amount as the total outlay on specialized health care,
for which the 19 counties is responsible. The elderly constitute the major
user group, 4 out of 5 persons receiving long-term care services are 67 years
or more6. The per capita expenditure is about 50,000 NOK measured rel-
ative to the number of people aged 67+. The care oﬀered is either free of
charge or heavily subsidized. User charges cover only a small share of total
expenditures to long-term care, less than 10 percent in 1993 (NOU 1997:17).
Even though user charges may to some degree regulate the demand for
long-term care, the type and level of care oﬀered is determined by the local
government. The latent conflict between central and local authorities re-
sulting from the decentralization of responsibilities of the welfare-state also
pertains to long-term care. The main goal for the long-term care services
as expressed in central government documents is that ’everybody in need of
long-term care is entitled to a satisfactory and, as much as possible, equiva-
lent supply of care independent of where they live, their level of income and
their social status’ (St meld nr 50 (1996-97)).
This paper aims at investigating variation between the municipalities in
the type and level of care oﬀered each client. A simple demand model frame-
work provides a theoretical point of departure for the analysis of the local
government decision on individual care levels. The empirical analysis is based
on data on individual consumption of publicly provided care and incorpo-
5Local government accounts. Statistics Norway.
6Nursing and care statistics. Statistics Norway.
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rates both client needs characteristics and economic, structural and political
characteristics of the local government. Two features of the care oﬀered is
analyzed, the probability of being oﬀered institutionalized care in a nursing
home, and the number of hours of care provided for those receiving home
care.
The paper also addresses the problem of spurious regression relation-
ships in analysis of data having a natural hierarchical structure. Micro-
econometrical analyses tend to ignore the possible interdependence among
lower level units (individuals) nested within higher level units (here: munici-
palities). The Norwegian long-term care system provides a setting well suited
to address the potentially severe biases in estimation results, also known
as Moulton bias (Moulton 1986), when applying OLS or similar regression
techniques when the data have this kind of grouped structure. Neglecting
the potential problem of random group eﬀects is especially problematic if
the analysis incorporates higher level explanatory variables since the bias
in OLS estimates may be particularly severe for variables that do not vary
within groups. A multilevel modeling approach incorporating random vari-
ation at both the individual and municipal level is applied in the empirical
analysis. Standard regression analyses ignoring random group eﬀects are also
performed serving as a basis for comparison. The potential grouping eﬀect
is overlooked in most studies of individual demand for long-term care (e.g.
Ettner 1994, Hoerger et al. 1996, Reschovsky 1996, 1998). Even though the
problem need not be as apparent as in our case, intra-group error correlation
is likely to be present in long-term care systems where the provider of services
or third-party payers play an important role in determining the access to and
the level and composition of services oﬀered, e.g. as is the case with public
fee-for-service financing where the shaping of the financial system may vary
between responsible authorities and perhaps even more so in managed care
systems (Degenholtz et al. 1999, Carey 2000).
The theoretical approach to the local government decision on client care
levels is developed in section 2. The data and the empirical specification
of the allotment functions are discussed in section 3, while the econometric
results are presented and discussed in section 4. Section 5 provides some
concluding remarks.
2 Theoretical approach
The dominating approach to the analysis of local government provision in
the literature is the median-voter model (Inman 1979, Rubinfeld 1987). The
median voter theorem states that with majority voting the chosen level of
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public provision corresponds to the level preferred by the voter with median
demand (Mueller 1989). Thus local government provision is identified by the
demand function of the median voter. The median-voter approach focuses
on the determination of the aggregate level of public provision. However,
the demand framework can be modified to incorporate the distributional
aspect of public provision as in e.g. Behrman and Craig’s (1987) analysis of
distribution of police protection among neighborhoods.
The demand framework modeling local public decisions as a result of
constrained maximization serves as the startingpoint also for the analysis
of the determination of individual long-term care service levels. However,
due to the well-known shortcomings of the median voter approach in case of
multidimensionality, the voting mechanism is played down focusing instead
on the local authority’s decision-making process. The modeling of the local
decision process follows previous studies of the local governments’ spending
decisions in Norway, starting with Rattsø (1989). The centralized system
of financing limits the municipalities’ ability to influence the income side of
the budget. Hence the municipal revenue is assumed to be fixed. The local
decision making is modeled ’as if’ a community preference function (Wildasin
1986) is maximized subject to the exogenous budget constraint. For sake of
simplicity we ignore the allocation of other municipal services than long-
term care on households and merge all other services into a composite good.
The preference function then include long-term care services (Y) and the
composite good (X):
V (Y,X;D,Z, I) (1)
The local decision-makers are concerned about the distribution of long-
term care services among recipients. Thus Y is a vector of individual service
levels (y1, .., yN), where N is the total population being served. The munic-
ipality is assumed to put unequal weight on clients with unequal needs and
the preferences are conditional on client specific characteristics represented
by the vector D=(d1,d2,...,dN). Furthermore local preferences are assumed
to be conditional on other structural characteristics of the municipality (Z)
influencing the desired service composition. I represent per capita private
consumption and is included to allow for the marginal rate of substitution
between local public services to depend on the level of private consumption.
The local authority is assumed to have perfect information about the long-
term care needs of their elderly population, and the final consumption pattern
reflects the local government’s allotment decisions. Theisen (1997) discusses
the distributional implications of uncertainty concerning the assessment of
individual needs within a theoretical framework similar to the one adopted
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here. The local decision problem reduces to:
Max
y1,..,yN ,X
V (y1, .., yN ,X;D,Z, I) s.t
NX
i=1
pyyk + pxX ≤ R (2)
yi ≥ 0,
i = 1, .., N
py and px represent the unit price of long-term care and the composite good
respectively, and R is the total per capita exogenous revenue. The optimiza-
tion process defines the individual allotment functions:
yi = gi(py, px, R;D,Z, I) (3)
The distribution of long-term care services on clients depends on unit
costs of services, municipal income, local structural characteristics, private
consumption, and individual need characteristics. Client care levels are ex-
pected to decrease with unit cost of long-term care and increase with the
level of municipal revenues. Individual service levels also depend on the
composition of long-term care service needs in the population. The vari-
ables measured by Z can be seen as indicators of aggregate demand for
municipal services captured by the composite service X, influencing the local
government’s preferred budget allocation. The major municipal services are
targeted toward diﬀerent age groups. Hence the age-composition of the pop-
ulation is an important determinant of aggregate demand for services, i.e. an
increase in the number of children in school age is expected to increase the
demand for primary education and to have a negative impact on long-term
care budgets and hence on individual care levels.
3 Data and empirical specification
The empirical analysis of individual care levels is based on data from an
information and management system called Gerix which is developed for the
Norwegian long-term care services. The Gerix data provides comprehensive
information on individual clients including variables capturing needs and
variables describing the type and amount of services received. The Gerix data
covers all users of long-term care services within the municipality. The users
are highly heterogeneous with respect both to age and type of disabilities and
needs. We concentrate on the major user group, the elderly aged 67 years
or more, excluding mentally challenged users and young and middle-aged
persons with chronic psychiatric or physical illnesses and disabilities.
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The number of weekly hours of direct care received provides an approx-
imate measure of individual care levels provided by the municipality. The
reported weekly hours of care is said to be of poor quality for the clients re-
ceiving institutional care7. To get around the problem the analysis of individ-
ual care levels is performed in two rounds. First, the fact that a client receives
institutional care is in itself an indication of the care level received since the
average nursing home client receives much higher numbers of weekly hours
of care than the average home care client8. Furthermore, institutional care
diﬀers from home care since the former implies 24-hours access to qualified
care and supervision. A discrete choice approach is chosen for the analysis of
the allotment of nursing home care. The dependent variable is a dichotomous
variable (Inst) taking on the value of one if the individual receives nursing
home care and zero otherwise. Next, the amount of care oﬀered persons re-
ceiving home care is analyzed separately. The dependent variable (Home) is
the natural logarithm of the total number of hours of care provided per week
in the form of help with (1) activities of daily living (ADL) and (2) instru-
mental activities of daily living (IADL), (3) rehabilitation of ADL functions,
(4) rehabilitation of IADL functions, (5) home nursing and (6) activities
directed towards strengthening psychological and social functioning. Other
care and services provided, i.e. in form of supervision or meals-on-wheels and
safety-alarms, are not included9. The logarithmic formulation prohibits the
possibility of negative estimates on hours of home care received.
The allotment functions derived in the previous section specify the indi-
vidual care levels as function of two set of explanatory variables, client needs
characteristics measured at the level of each client and local government
characteristics measured at the municipal level. Table A1 in the appendix
provides a description of the variables used in the empirical analysis.
The primary client needs characteristic included is the variable capturing
functional status (Func), i.e. disabilities related to ADL and IADL func-
tions, and cognitive and emotional problems. Functional status is found in
US studies (e.g. Ettner 1994, Reschovsky 1996, 1998) to be a major determi-
nant of the demand for long-term care. Functional status is also likely to be
an important factor in the municipal assessment of needs. Age and sex are
7E.g. based on nurses evaluation in a survey conducted by the national union of trained
nurses in 1995.
8In our data the average number of weekly hours of care for nursing home clients and
home care clients are 28 and 5 respectively.
9A few clients receives only the kind of services not included in the registration of
weekly hours of care and hence are registered with zero hours of care. These clients drop
out from the analysis since the natural logarithm of hours of care is used as the dependent
variable.
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also previously shown to influence the demand for long-term care. Dummy
variables indicating marital status and household status (whether the person
lives alone), and a variable capturing the access to informal (unpaid) care are
included as indicators of the amount of social support available to the elderly,
which may at least to some extent be a substitute for formal care. Household
status and access to informal care are only included in the home care anal-
ysis10. The allotment functions define individual care levels as function of a
vector of client characteristics. This specification cannot be estimated. Thus
the empirical specification only include the client’s own characteristics. The
influence of other clients’ characteristics is represented by socio-demographic
variables measured at the municipal level reflecting aggregate demand.
The purpose of the empirical analysis is to investigate diﬀerences in care
levels between local governments. Client characteristics function as control
variables. The variable of primary interest is municipal income, measured
by the total per capita tax revenues and general grants (MunicInc). The
estimated eﬀect of municipal income on individual service levels relates to the
discussion of the distributional properties of the grant system. The purpose
of the grant system is to equalize tax revenues and expenditure needs and
thus enable the local governments to provide uniform services levels. If long-
term care service levels is found to be significantly related to the level of
municipal income then the centralized system of finance fails to eliminate
diﬀerences in client care levels due to varying local economic conditions.
Previous studies of Norwegian local authorities, e.g. Rattsø (1989) and
Borge and Rattsø (1995), have shown that the overall service composition
is influenced by local socio-demographic characteristics representing mea-
sures of aggregate demand. Within an exogenous budget constraint there
is a struggle between diﬀerent user-groups, first and foremost diﬀerent age
groups, for resources. An increase in the population share of children in
school age increases the demand for primary education, while an increase
in the elderly population increases the budget share of long-term care. The
share of children (%Child), youth (%Y outh), and elderly (%Elderly) in the
population, and the share of the old amongst the elderly (%Old) are included
to capture the political influence of diﬀerent age-groups. A second set of vari-
ables assumed to influence the aggregate demand for long-term care services
10For nursing home residents household status reflects their situation after entering
the nursing home, i.e. if they live in a single-bed room or shared room. There may
be a general simultaneity problem related to the informal care variable, i.e. feedback
eﬀects from municipal care to informal care. The problem is likely to be more severe for
institutional care than for home care, since nursing home care implies that the elderly is
removed from their home and local community into an environment that provides 24-hours
access to supervision and care.
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is also included. High mortality rates (Mortality) and a high share of the
old population living alone (%Alone) is assumed to increase the demand for
long-term care services amongst the elderly. While an increased population
share of mentally challenged persons (%MentChall) and non-senior disabled
persons (%Disabled) may imply a tougher competition for long-term care
services. The analysis also include a dummy variable (HostMunic) indicat-
ing whether the municipality is a former ’host-municipality’ for a specialized
institution for severally mentally challenged persons11. Traditionally women
have been the primary suppliers of informal (unpaid) care to their elderly
relatives. The female work-participation rate (FemWork) is included to
capture the possible lower capacity for informal care in municipalities with
a high work-participation rate for women. The level of private consump-
tion, assumed to influence the desired composition of local public services, is
represented by the per capita private after-tax income (PrivInc).
Data on relative prices of municipal services are not available. However,
population size (Pop) and settlement pattern, here represented by the aver-
age traveling time to the center of the municipality (Distance), are expected
to aﬀect relative prices and are included to represent local cost conditions.
The grant system includes a special grant for the municipalities in Northern-
Norway. The argument for the extra grant to Northern-Norway is special
climatic and structural conditions not captured by the criteria used in the
grant system. The grant is also motivated by regional political considera-
tions (NOU 1996:1). We control for the potential cost-disadvantage of being
located in the north of Norway by entering a dummy for the municipalities
in Northern-Norway (North).
Finally, we include a set of variables describing local politics. The Norwe-
gian municipalities are formally run by the local council. The representatives
holding seats in the local council are elected on basis of party aﬃliation. The
municipalities diﬀer a lot, both in the size and number of parties represented
and with regard to the political orientation (color) of the parties dominat-
ing local politics. The importance of the political system in understanding
the behavior of the local public sector is evident from previous Norwegian
studies, e.g. Kalseth and Rattsø (1998). The results in Kalseth (2000) doc-
ument the significance of ideological orientation and political fragmentation
for eﬃciency variations within the long-term care services. It is of interest to
investigate whether political factors also aﬀect the service level oﬀered indi-
11In 1991 the responsibility of providing long-term care to mentally challenged persons
with comprehensive needs was transferred from the counties to the municipalities. The
municipalities where the specialized institutions were located prior to the reform (the ’host-
municipalities’) have a relatively high share of mentally challenged persons demanding high
service levels.
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vidual clients. The influence of local politics on service levels demonstrates
the operation of local discretion in setting priorities. The share of socialist
representatives (Soc) and the number of parties represented in the local coun-
cil (NOP ) are included to capture the eﬀect of political orientation and party
fragmentation respectively. The share of female representatives (FemRepr)
is included to capture other aspects of representation than party color.
The data have a nested, or grouped, structure; individual clients are
nested within provider units, i.e. municipalities. In such a setting group spe-
cific eﬀects are to be expected. With higher level variables to be estimated
fixed eﬀect, or least square dummy variable, models are not feasible. Assum-
ing random group eﬀects the individual error terms will be composed by both
client specific and municipal specific components. The composite error term
will be correlated for clients living within the same municipality violating the
standard assumptions of independence and common variance. Ignoring the
’intra-class correlation’ and applying standard regression approaches such as
ordinary least squares (OLS) give downward biased estimates of standard
errors and the significance levels of parameters will be misleading (overes-
timated). In the empirical analysis a multilevel regression model is applied
which incorporates random parameters both at the individual and municipal
level (Goldstein 1999). When involving only random intercepts the model
is equivalent to the error component, or random eﬀects, model of the panel
data literature (Maddala, chapter 14). When group sizes are large, as in our
case, multilevel analysis provides consistent estimates also in the case when
the random group eﬀects are correlated with the regressors (Blundell and
Windmeijer 1997).
The multilevel specification for the linear regression model in the case of
a single explanatory variable at each level is illustrated in equation (4):
yil = β0 + β1dil + γ0zl + ul + eil (4)
The dependent variable yil is in our case the natural logarithm of the
number of hours help per week received by individual i (i = 1, .., Nl) in
municipality l (l = 1, .., L), and dil and zl are the explanatory variables
measured at the individual and municipal level respectively. The random
part of the model is represented by the composite error term ul + eil, where
eil is the random error term for the ith user within the lth municipality and
ul represent unmeasured variation at the municipal level, and both random
errors are assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and constant
variance, σ2e and σ
2
u respectively. Furthermore, we assume that the random
disturbances at the individual and municipality level are uncorrelated, i.e.
cov(eil, ul)=0. Thus the conditional variance of yil equals σ2e + σ
2
u. There is
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a positive covariance between any two users within the same municipality,
equaling cov(ul, ul)=σ2u since the error terms associated with the individual
level are assumed to be independent. The ’intra-group correlation coeﬃcient’
ρ = σ2u(σ
2
u + σ
2
e)
−1 provides a measure of the strength of the grouping eﬀect
(Goldstein 1999).
For the discrete choice model let πjl be the probability that user j in
municipality l receives institutionalized care. Assuming a logistic distribution
for the expected probability (using the same general variable notation as for
the linear model for simplicity) we have:
Prob(yjl = 1) = πjl = [1 + e−(β0+β1djl+γ0zl+ul)]−1 (5)
where the random disturbance at the municipal level ul again is assumed to be
normally distributed with zero mean and constant variance σ2u. The response
variable yjl , equaling 1 if the user receives nursing home care and 0 otherwise,
is assumed distributed as Binomial(1,πjl). The conditional variance of yjl
var(yjl|πjl)=πjl(1− πjl). The model can now be written as in equation (6):
yjl = πjl + ejlwjl (6)
where wjl =
p
πjl(1− πjl) and σ2e = 1.
The linear regression model is estimated using the restricted iterative gen-
eralized leased square (RIGLS) method. Starting with reasonable estimates
of the parameters of the deterministic part of the model the iterative GLS
procedure (IGLS) alternates between estimation of the fixed and random pa-
rameters until convergence. The maximum likelihood estimates produced by
applying IGLS under the assumption of multivariate normality will generally
be biased. The RIGLS procedure adjusts for the sampling variation of the
fixed parameters. The discrete choice model is estimated using the 2nd order
predictive quasilikelihood (PQL) procedure. The model is linearized using a
Taylor series expansion using the first derivatives of the nonlinear function
for the fixed part and the first and second derivatives for the random part.
With the PQL the Taylor series is expanded around the predicted value of
the current iteration of the RIGLS algorithm, i.e. using the current estimate
of both the fixed and random parameters. Goldstein (1999) provides thor-
ough description of the estimation procedures. The estimation is performed
by use of the MLWin software package (Rasbash et al. 2000).
The development of the Gerix system started around 1990 and by 1996,
the year of study, 48 municipalities have taken the system into active use12.
12The current oﬃcial long-term care statistics in Norway does not provide information
on individual users, only aggregate measures on the level and composition of services.
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Our sample covers 40 municipalities excluding those that do not provide
complete data for their long-term care services. Users with missing values
on variables used in the analysis are excluded13. The resulting sample covers
19,234 elderly users of long-term care services residing in the 40 municipali-
ties. The number of elderly users per municipality ranges from 56 to 2,550.
If the municipalities using the Gerix system diﬀer from the non-users in
relevant aspects it may represent a potential selection-bias problem. Small
municipalities, in terms of population size, are clearly underrepresented in
the sample, see table A2 in the appendix. Since the sample may be less
representative for the small municipalities results both for the full sample and
for a reduced sample excluding municipalities with less than 3,000 inhabitants
is presented. Excluding the municipalities with less than 3,000 inhabitants
reduces the sample to 36 municipalities covering 18,824 persons.
Table A2 provides sample means for the full sample and for the munic-
ipalities with less than 3,000 inhabitants. Separate figures for individual
characteristics for home care clients are shown. For the municipal charac-
teristics national means are also shown. The majority of the long-term care
clients, 74 percent, receive home care. The elderly oﬀered nursing home care
are on average more functionally impaired and somewhat older than the av-
erage home care client. On average the home care client receives 5.1 hours
of care per week. A majority, 74 percent, of the elderly receiving home care
lives alone and 57 percent have access to less than six hours of informal care
per week. The elderly users living in the four municipalities with less than
3,000 inhabitants are somewhat less disabled, are more often married and
male, are less likely to live alone, and have more access to informal care.
The average number of hours of home care is somewhat higher for the small
municipalities, but the proportion of users receiving institutionalized care do
not diﬀer from the larger municipalities.
The municipalities included in the sample clearly diﬀers from the rest of
the municipalities in two respects. They are larger, are more often ’host-
municipalities’. Further, larger municipalities tend to have lower municipal
income, a younger population and be more politically fragmented.
4 Results
The results for the discrete choice of institutionalization are presented in table
1 and the results from the analysis of hours of care oﬀered clients receiving
home care are presented in table 2.
13All the users in one municipality have missing value on marital status. To avoid
excluding the municipality, missing values on marital status are imputed.
12
Table 1 Logit estimation of probability of institutionalizationa.
Full sample Pop > 3000
’Standard’ Logit Multilevel ’Standard’ Logit Multilevel
Cons -6.784 (-44.46)∗∗ -7.013 (-29.60)∗∗ -7.287 (-36.49)∗∗ -7.451 (-17.89)∗∗
Individual characteristics
Func 4.655 (18.63)∗∗ 4.694 (17.81)∗∗ 4.642 (18.41)∗∗ 4.663 (17.50)∗∗
Func2 -0.382 (-7.87)∗∗ -0.362 (-7.09)∗∗ -0.379 (-7.74)∗∗ -0.358 (-6.93)∗∗
Age 0.0495 (13.37)∗∗ 0.053 (13.92)∗∗ 0.050 (13.35)∗∗ 0.053 (13.79)∗∗
Male 0.000 (0.00) -0.008 (-0.13) 0.003 (0.05) -0.010 (-0.16)
Non-married 0.517 (8.07)∗∗ 0.547 (8.32)∗∗ 0.517 (7.98)∗∗ 0.540 (8.14)∗∗
Municipal charactristics
MunicInc 0.064 (7.07)∗∗ 0.052 (2.26)∗∗ -0.021 (-0.83) -0.017 (-0.23)
PrivInc 0.0107 (2,93)∗∗ 0.005 (0.29) 0.024 (4.64)∗∗ 0.022 (0.96)
%Child -0.486 (-6.72)∗∗ -0.034 (-0.17) -0.562 (-6.84)∗∗ -0.204 (-0.81)
%Youth -0.192 (-2.96)∗∗ -0.261 (-1.31) -0.100 (-1.40) -0.120 (-0.54)
%Elderly -0.181 (-5.49)∗∗ -0.047 (-0.52) -0.163 (-4.26)∗∗ -0.060 (-0.54)
%Old 0.003 (0.13) -0.022 (-0.32) -0.019 (-0.85) 0.009 (0.13)
%MentChall -0.430 (-3.86)∗∗ -0.403 (-1.24) 0.045 (0.27) -0.065 (-0.13)
HostMunic 0.748 (6.89)∗∗ 0.862 (2.22)∗∗ 0.840 (7.60)∗∗ 1.018 (2.57)∗∗
Mortality -0.001 (-1.46) 0.001 (0.37) -0.002 (-2.54)∗∗ 0.000 (0.04)
%Disabled -0.006 (-0.17) -0.057 (-0.54) -0.043 (-1.18) 0.004 (0.04)
%Alone -0.049 (-3.46)∗∗ -0.048 (-1.32) -0.037 (-1.90)∗ -0.035 (-0.61)
FemWork -0.071 (-4.76)∗∗ -0.094 (-2.18)∗∗ -0.071 (-4.62)∗∗ -0.094 (-2.10)∗∗
Distance 0.014 (2.78)∗∗ 0.027 (1.79)∗ 0.024 (4.01)∗∗ 0.034 (1.92)∗
Pop -0.000 (-0.10) 0.002 (0.31) -0.003 (-1.68)∗ 0.005 (0.72)
North 0.271 (2.09)∗∗ 0.055 (0.14) 0.734 (4.78)∗∗ 0.0551 (1.14)
FemRepr -0.015 (-3.03)∗∗ -0.027 (-1.59) -0.010 (-2.08)∗∗ -0.019 (-1.08)
Soc -0.020 (-3.98)∗∗ -0.018 (-1.18) -0.012 (-2.17)∗∗ -0.007 (-0.39)
NOP 0.046 (0.97) -0.007 (-0.05) 0.004 (0.08) -0.038 (-0.26)
Random eﬀects (standard errors in parentheses)
σ2u 0.336 (0.086) 0.321 (0.086)
a t-values in parentheses. * and ** denotes significance at 10% and 5% level respectively.
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Table 2 Regression of hours of home care receiveda.
Full sample Pop > 3000
OLS Multilevel OLS Multilevel
Cons -0.062 (-1.78)∗ -0.071 (-1.31) -0.088 (-1.85)∗ -0.110 (-1.16)
Individual characteristics
Func 2.121 (27.09)∗∗ 2.101 (26.85)∗∗ 2.090 (26.52)∗∗ 2.077 (26.36)∗∗
Func2 -0.220 (-11.79)∗∗ -0.217 (-11.60)∗∗ -0.213 (-11.36)∗∗ -0.211 (-11.25)∗∗
Age 0.004 (3.70)∗∗ 0.004 (3.40)∗∗ 0.004 (3.69)∗∗ 0.004 (3.31)∗∗
Male -0.081 (-4.58)∗∗ -0.081 (-4.62)∗∗ -0.076 (-4.24)∗∗ -0.075 (-4.23)∗∗
Non-married -0.006 (-0.20) -0.003 (-0.12) 0.007 (0.26) 0.007 (0.26)
Alone 0.311 (11.69)∗∗ 0.307 (11.55)∗∗ 0.296 (10.97)∗∗ 0.295 (10.96)∗∗
Inf. care-Little -0.024 (-1.15) -0.012 (-0.54) -0.023 (-1.09) -0.012 (-0.57)
Inf. care-Some -0.070 (-3.32)∗∗ -0.053 (-2.48)∗∗ -0.066 (-3.10)∗∗ -0.053 (-2.44)∗∗
Inf. care-Much -0.193 (-7.44)∗∗ -0.179 (-6.81)∗∗ -0.186 (-7.07)∗∗ -0.173 (-6.50)∗∗
Municipal characteristics
MunicInc 0.013 (4.59)∗∗ 0.013 (2.14)∗∗ 0.007 (1.07) 0.004 (0.21)
PrivInc -0.007 (-6.06)∗∗ -0.008 (-1.81)∗ -0.005 (-3.10)∗∗ -0.004 (-0.67)
%Child 0.111 (5.26)∗∗ 0.058 (1.09) 0.144 (6.08)∗∗ 0.083 (1.40)
%Youth 0.033 (1.72)∗ 0.032 (0.64) 0.016 (0.76) 0.015 (0.28)
%Elderly 0.023 (2.36)∗∗ 0.011 (0.46) 0.021 (1.91)∗ 0.006 (0.22)
%Old -0.017 (-2.59)∗∗ -0.010 (-0.56) -0.012 (-1.77)∗ 0.004 (0.21)
%MentChall -0.026 (-0.79) -0.025 (-0.30) -0.012 (-0.26) -0.011 (-0.09)
HostMunic -0.012 (-0.36) -0.003 (-0.03) -0.027 (-0.81) -0.001 (-0.01)
Mortality 0.0007 (3.95)∗∗ 0.0009 (1.74)∗ 0.0004 (2.18)∗∗ 0.0003 (0.61)
%Disabled -0.023 (-2.39)∗∗ -0.021 (-0.80) -0.009 (-0.90) 0.003 (0.11)
%Alone -0.018 (-4.39)∗∗ -0.024 (-2.61)∗∗ -0.008 (-1.49) -0.014 (-1.05)
FemWork -0.018 (-4.27)∗∗ -0.012 (-1.13) -0.016 (-3.81)∗∗ -0.010 (-1.00)
Distance 0.004 (2.61)∗∗ 0.003 (0.89) 0.006 (3.30)∗∗ 0.006 (1.43)
Pop -0.0043 (-8.42)∗∗ -0.0043 (-2.39)∗∗ -0.0045 (-8.26)∗∗ -0.0041 (-2.49)∗∗
North -0.374 (-9.96)∗∗ -0.369 (-3.71)∗∗ -0.364 (-8.29)∗∗ -0.328 (-2.91)∗∗
FemRepr 0.013 (8.69)∗∗ 0.016 (3.58)∗∗ 0.012 (7.79)∗∗ 0.015 (3.47)∗∗
Soc -0.001 (0.67) -0.003 (-0.69) 0.000 (0.22) -0.001 (-0.13)
NOP 0.071 (4.98)∗∗ 0.082 (2.35)∗∗ 0.062 (3.98)∗∗ 0.057 (1.66)∗
Random eﬀects (standard errors in parentheses)
σ2e 0.779 (0.009) 0.772 (0.009) 0.776 (0.010) 0.770 (0.009)
σ2u 0.021 (0.006) 0.017 (0.005)
Intra-group corr (ρ) 0.026 0.021
-2Logl 35014 34959 34198 34163
-2Logl (null) 41810 41291 40867 40382
a t-values in parentheses. * and ** denotes significance at 10% and 5% level respectively.
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The average predicted probability of receiving nursing home care is 0.26,
i.e. equal to the actual share of nursing home users. The model increases
the proportion of correctly predicted cases, using a probability cutoﬀ of 0.50,
compared to a naive guess14 from 0.61 to 0.87. The null of the estimates for
all the variables equaling zero in the home care equation is clearly rejected
using a likelihood ratio (LR) test 15.
4.1 Random group eﬀects
The estimates on the intra-municipality variance indicate the presence of
random group eﬀects in our data. An LR test of the null of no random
group eﬀect in the analysis of hours of home care received is clearly rejected
(55.2 with 1 d.f.). However the intra-group variation is small relative to
the total variation. The intra-group correlation is only 0.026. Figure 1 and
2 show the estimated residuals associated with the municipal level for the
nursing home and home care analysis respectively. The residuals are ranked
in order of the size of the estimate. In order to assess diﬀerences between
the municipalities the confidence intervals shown are constructed such that
the significance level for judging non-overlap between any pair of residuals
on average is 5 %. These are given by ±1.39 standard errors of the estimate
(Goldstein 1999). For most pair of municipalities the intervals do overlap.
However, we see that the interval at each end of the ranking do not overlap.
Thus there evidently are diﬀerences in care levels among municipalities.
Comparison of the results from the ’standard’ Logit and OLS estimation
and the Multilevel estimation show the severe biases in estimation results
for the variables measured at the municipal level resulting from ignoring the
intra-group error correlation among individuals receiving care from the same
public provider. The downward bias in standard errors implies an increased
probability of type I error, i.e. incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis.
Based on the results from the ’standard’ Logit and OLS estimation a majority
of the municipal characteristics appears to be significant. However only a
few variables are significant at the 10 percent level when allowing random
group eﬀects. The estimation results for the individual characteristics are
not aﬀected much by the choice of estimation method.
Generally the biases will be larger the higher the average group size, the
14The naive model is based on a binomial random number generation given a probability
of institutionalization of 0.261.
15The likelihood ratio statistic -2[Logl (restricted) - Logl (unrestricted)]=6332 for the
full sample, which is distributed as χ2 with 26 degree of freedom. The approximation of the
log likelihood for nonlinear models is not reliable when the response is binary (Goldstein
1999).
15
Figure 1: Simultaneous confidence intervals for the estimated municipality
residuals. Probability of institutionalization.
Figure 2: Simultaneous confidence intervals for the estimated municipality
residuals. Natural logarithm of weekly hours of home care.
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larger the variation in group size, the higher the intra-group error correla-
tion and the higher the intra-group correlation of the regressors (Moulton
1986). Our dataset fulfills the first two conditions, the average number of
users and the variation in the number of users per municipality is high. Given
the structure of the dataset even a small intra-group error correlation may
cause relatively large estimation biases if the intra-group correlation of the
regressors is large enough. The municipal characteristics do not vary between
individuals residing within the same municipality, i.e. the intra-class corre-
lation equals unity. The bias will therefore be particularly large for this set
of variables. The intra-group correlation of the individual characteristics, on
the other hand, is low contributing to minor biases in the estimates for these
variables.
4.2 Variation in municipal care levels
Client need characteristics are the major determinants of local governments’
decision on individual service levels within long-term care of the elderly.
The single most important variable, both concerning the probability of being
oﬀered nursing home care and for the service level received when being oﬀered
home care, is functional disability. Age and sex also influence the care oﬀered.
Furthermore, the municipalities take into account the living situation and the
amount of social support available to the elderly in setting care levels.
The municipalities’ decisions on the allotment of care to clients are taken
under varying local conditions influencing the choice on the type and level of
care oﬀered. Firstly, there do seem to be an income eﬀect. Elderly long-term
care clients living in high-income municipalities are more likely to receive
nursing home care than elderly with similar individual characteristics living
in less aﬄuent municipalities. Service levels for home care clients are also
significantly positively related to municipal income. The eﬀects are non-
negligible. On average, the estimated eﬀect of an 10,000 NOK increase in the
per capita municipal income (equals 1,3 standard deviations) is to increase
the probability of nursing home care by 4 percentage points16 and the weekly
hour of home care per client by 13 percent.
16In the logit model the marginal eﬀects are given by Λ(β0x)
£
1− Λ(β0x)
¤
β , where Λ(·)
indicates the logistic cumulative distribution function (Green 1997, ch. 19) and x includes
higher level variables. The scale factor, Λ(β0x)
£
1− Λ(β0x)
¤
, is first evaluated at every
observation then the sample average for the individual scale factors (0.083) is used. Thus
the average marginal eﬀect is calculated as 0.083*β. In a multilevel model the estimated
probabilities is group specific. In the discussion of the results zero group eﬀect is assumed.
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Table 3 Interaction eﬀects between functional status and municipal incomea.
Full sample Pop > 3000
I II I II
Nursing home care
MunicInc 0.030 (1.14) 0.0120(0.27) -0.061 (-0.76) -0.161 (-1.73)∗
MunicInc*Func 0.020 (1.77)∗ 0.080 (1.30) 0.025 (1.59) 0.245 (2.50)∗∗
MunicInc*Func2 -0.012 (1.01) -0.041 (2.33)∗∗
Home care
MunicInc 0.013 (1.98)∗∗ 0.006 (0.83) 0.005 (0.28) 0.001 (0.07)
MunicInc*Func 0.0008 (0.23) 0.051 (2.70)∗∗ -0.002 (-0.44) 0.024 (0.99)
MunicInc*Func2 -0.013 (2.70)∗∗ -0.006 (-1.07)
a t-values in parentheses. * and ** denotes significance at 10% and 5% level respectively.
In the analysis the eﬀect of municipal income is assumed to be equal
for all users. However, the assessment of individual needs may systemati-
cally diﬀer between diﬀerent types of municipalities. In order to investigate
whether ’rich’ and ’poor’ municipalities diﬀer in their assessment of needs
the model is reestimated including interaction terms between functional dis-
ability and municipal income. The results are reported in table 3. There is
a tendency for the marginal eﬀect of functional disability on the probability
of institutionalization to be higher for high income municipalities than for
low income municipalities17. The eﬀect of municipal income on service lev-
els for the home care clients also varies with functional status. The results
reveal a ∩-shaped relationship. The marginal eﬀect of municipal income is
declining for clients with functional disability somewhat above the mean for
home care clients, and is negative for high levels of functional disability. The
latter result applies for less than two percent of the home care clients and
is driven by the fit to the model for the ’lighter’ clients. Adding a third de-
gree term to the model is statistical significant (not reported) and captures a
positive marginal eﬀect of municipal income for clients with very high scores
on the disability variable. Thus the diﬀerence in home care levels between
high-income municipalities and low-income municipalities seem to be largest
for clients with moderate needs.
The per capita private consumption does not seem to influence the local
government decision on nursing home placement. There is however a ten-
dency for the service level of home care clients to be negatively related to
per capita private consumption. Hence, private consumption may be a sub-
stitute for publicly provided home care. The per capita municipal income is
17The eﬀect is stronger assuming no direct eﬀect of municipal income (not reported).
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negatively correlated with the per capita private income. The grant system
tends to translate private ’poverty’ to public ’wealth’ and vice versa.
Ignoring random group eﬀects, the majority of the structural variables in-
cluded to capture variation in aggregate demand and cost conditions appear
to be significantly related to long-term care service levels of the elderly. How-
ever for most variables this is spurious regression relationship. The results for
the multi-level analyses reveal no systematic relationships between e.g. the
age composition of the population, which is the important determinant of the
aggregate service composition, and client care levels. Some of the aggregate
demand variables included are however found to be significantly related to
client care levels. Firstly, elderly living in a former ’host-municipality’ have
a higher probability of receiving institutionalized care than others18. Next,
the female work participation rate is found to have a negative impact on the
probability of institutionalization. Assuming that the overall access to infor-
mal care is negatively correlated with the female work participation rate the
estimated eﬀect probably represent an aggregate demand eﬀect, i.e. higher
demand for services induces a substitution of home care for nursing home
care. The female work participation rate may alternatively capture diﬀer-
ences in local preferences on institutionalization. Finally, mortality rates and
the share of single-person households among the elderly above 80 years of age
seem to influence service levels of home care clients. High mortality rates are
associated with higher service levels, while the share of single person house-
holds amongst the old is found to contribute to a lowering of the number of
hours of care oﬀered home care clients. The latter result probably reflects
that the municipalities respond to an increase in the aggregate demand for
home care services by reducing the amount of care oﬀered each client. The
opposite result for the mortality rate may indicate that the variable cap-
tures unmeasured variation at the individual level. The variables included
to capture local cost conditions are also found to contribute to variation in
service levels. Municipalities with a dispersed settlement in terms of high
average traveling distance to the municipal center seem to be more prone to
provide nursing home care to their elderly long-term care users. One possi-
18The dummy for ’host-municipalities’, i.e. municipalities that were hosting specialized
institutions for mentally challenged persons prior to the reform in 1991, was included to
capture the high demand for long-term care services of mentally challenged persons in
these municipalities, supposed to aﬀect care levels of the elderly negatively. However the
opposite eﬀect is found. The intention of the reform in 1991 was to de-institutionalize the
mentally challenged. Thus the municipalities were given the responsibility of providing
long-term services in home like environments. Hence the reform implied that a considerable
institutional capacity became free for alternative use. This is probably what is captured
by the ’host-municipality’ eﬀect.
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ble interpretation of the result is that it reflects a relative price eﬀect. The
cost of home care compared to institutionalized care is likely to be higher in
municipalities with long traveling distances. Population size contributes to
variation in home care service levels between the municipalities. Large mu-
nicipalities oﬀer less hours of home care than the smaller ones. This may also
represent a price eﬀect. Or it may indicate that the grant system does not
fully capture the expenditure needs of the large municipalities as is some-
times claimed. We also find a strong negative eﬀect on home care service
levels of the dummy variable for Northern-Norway.
The results also demonstrate that local politics matter for individual care
levels. There is a strong positive relationship between home care service levels
and the share of female representatives in the local council. The estimated
eﬀect implies that a ten percentage point increase in the share of female
representatives increases the weekly hours of care oﬀered home care clients
by about 15 percent. Client care levels are also found to be positively related
to the number of parties represented in the local council.
The results discussed so far relate to the analyses based on the full sam-
ple. Not all the results carry over to the analysis of the sample excluding
the small municipalities. Many of the municipal characteristics are corre-
lated with population size contributing to unstable estimates. The eﬀect of
municipal income is sensitive to the exclusion of the smallest municipalities
from the sample. The small municipalities are mostly found among the high-
income municipalities. This has partly to do with the fact that population
size is used as a criterion in the grant system, favoring the small municipali-
ties. An income eﬀect is not found for the larger municipalities, indicating a
more successful income-equalization policy with regard to client care levels
among the larger municipalities. However, the results in table 3 reveal an
interaction eﬀect between municipal income and functional disabilities for
the probability of institutionalization also in the reduced sample. Exclud-
ing the small municipalities, the marginal eﬀect of income becomes negative.
The ∩-shaped relationship detected implies that diﬀerences due to income is
largest for clients at each end of the disability scale. The high and low in-
come municipalities are equally likely to oﬀer institutionalized care to clients
with average disability score for nursing home clients. The result for the high
needers is moderated when allowing a more flexible specification of the inter-
action eﬀect (not reported). There is a trend towards de-institutionalization
within long-term care. Giving the elderly in need of long-term care the choice
of independent living is a stated goal of the central government (St meld nr 50
(1996-97)). If the larger, high-income municipalities are in front of the devel-
opment this may explain the above results. The results reveal no interaction
eﬀects for home care service levels among the larger municipalities.
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4.3 Discussion
The analyses only cover elderly receiving care from the municipality. This
may bias the results. The local governments may diﬀer, not only in the
amount of care consumed for those being oﬀered municipal care, but also in
the threshold for receiving care. Table A3 in the appendix shows the results of
an analysis of long-term care coverage among elderly aged 67 years or more19,
covering a sample of 394 municipalities using data on elderly long-term care
users from the Nursing and care statistics of Statistics Norway.
Variation in service levels due to varying local economic, structural and
political conditions show up both in service standards and coverage ratios.
The long-term care coverage ratio is positively related to per capita munic-
ipal income. Thus municipal income aﬀects both client care levels and the
threshold for receiving care. The coverage ratio is negatively related to per
capita after tax private income again indicating that private consumption is
a substitute for public provision of long-term care. The results reveal a nega-
tive relationship between coverage and the share of elderly in the population.
Thus the struggle between the age groups for resources appears to show up
in accessibility rather than service levels of those receiving care. The results
confirm that the share of single-person households among the elderly above
80 years of age and the female work-participation rate are positively related
to aggregate demand for long-term care services. Traveling distances within
the municipality do not only aﬀect the probability of receiving nursing home
care. Municipalities with a dispersed settlement also have higher coverage
ratios than municipalities with shorter average traveling time to the center
of the municipality. Finally, the municipalities in Northern-Norway seem to
trade-oﬀ service standards of home care clients for higher coverage among
the elderly. Political fragmentation seems to have the opposite eﬀect.
The centralized system of finance and mandatory spending does not con-
strain local discretion to the extent that we observe uniform service levels
across the country. Variation in municipal income contributes to variation
both in accessibility and services standards within the long-term care ser-
vices. The grant system does not secure full equalization. The results of
the analyses may indicate that the grant system in fact contributes to diﬀer-
ences in service levels across municipalities by ’overcompensating’ for cost-
disadvantages due to (low) population size and (high) traveling distances.
The municipalities with high expenditure needs ends up with the best ser-
vice supply. The influence of local politics on client care levels demonstrates
the exercise of local discretion in setting priorities.
19The coverage ratio is calculated as: Users aged 67+Elderly aged 67+ ∗ 100.
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The theoretical framework motivating the empirical analysis focuses ex-
clusively on the municipal allocation process. This is a reasonable simpli-
fication as long as the services are free of charge or user charges are set so
low that individual demand always exceeds municipal supply. Then the con-
sumption pattern reflects the municipalities’ assessment of individual needs.
As a simplification user charges are not introduced in the model. The mu-
nicipal decision on user charges is complex involving both the revenue eﬀect
and community welfare eﬀects. The assumption of the individual consump-
tion being supply constrained is likely not to hold for all elderly clients, in
which case individual consumption reflects both client and municipal deci-
sions. The results of the empirical analyses can be viewed as reduced form
estimates. The Gerix data do not provide information on clients’ income
or other economic variables that may aﬀect individual demand. Client in-
come may also influence the municipal decision on allocation of care, e.g. the
municipalities may adopt a discriminatory policy in the decision on which
clients is to be oﬀered nursing home care since high income individuals pays
a higher price than low income individuals. The absence of client income in
the econometric analysis may bias the result of the other variables.
The present analysis represents a first attempt to investigate variation in
individual long-term care levels within a decentralized public provision sys-
tem focusing on diﬀerences between the local governments. Hopefully, data
on long-term care clients will be available for a larger number of municipal-
ities in the future. More observations at the municipal level will give more
precise estimates on variation among the municipalities in individual care
levels. Future research should look more closely into the assumption of sup-
plied constrained consumption of care and be directed towards disentangling
provider decisions from individual demand eﬀects.
The study demonstrates the importance of taking into account the group-
ing eﬀects in micro-econometrical analyses of data having a hierarchical struc-
ture. Ignoring the possibility of random group eﬀects implies that we assume
that there are as many independent observations as there are individuals in
the dataset. Given the fact that the municipality makes the decision on the
amount and type of care oﬀered it is not likely that the assumption will
hold. Comparison of multi-level modeling results with the results from using
standard regression techniques reveals the considerable spurious regression
relationships found when applying the latter.
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5 Conclusion
Client characteristics are the predominant determinants of individual con-
sumption of long-term care in the decentralized public long-term care system
in Norway. The municipalities allocate their long-term care budgets based
on assessment of individual needs. There are however significant provider
eﬀects on individual care levels after controlling for client attributes, i.e. the
care levels oﬀered clients with identical attributes varies between the munic-
ipalities.
The decentralization of responsibilities of important welfare services such
as long-term care challenges the central government concern for horizontal
equity. The local governments face diﬀerent economic and structural con-
ditions constraining their choice set. The centralized system of finance is
designed to prevent large diﬀerences in service levels across the country due
to varying local conditions. However, the grant system does not fully equal-
ize the ’economic opportunities’ of the local governments. In fact the grant
system seems to introduce inequalities. The revision of the grant system
in 1997 was an attempt to improve the distributional profile of the system
(NOU 1996:1).
Income and expenditure needs equalization is not suﬃcient to secure
equalization in service levels. Decentralization of responsibilities implies local
freedom in setting priorities. It is evident that diﬀerences in local priorities
contribute to variation in service levels. The central government can, and
do, limit undesirable inequalities due to variation in local preferences by im-
posing restrictions on service standards and accessibility. However, extensive
regulation implies de facto centralization of responsibilities.
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Appendix
Table A1 Description of variables.
Variable Description
Dependent variables
Inst =1 if person resides in a nursing home or old age home, =0 otherwise.
Home The natural logarithm of hours of home care per week (sum help with (1) activitis
of daily living (ADL) and (2) instrumental activities of dalily living (IADL),
(3) rehabilitation of ADL and (4) IADL functions, (5) home health care and
(6) activities directed towards strengthening psycological and social functioning.
Individual characteristics
Func Average score on 17 variables representing ADL and IADL
disabilities and limitations in psychological and social functioninga.
The score on each variables ranges from 1 (need no help/represent
no problem) to 4 (entierly dependent on help to perform
the activity/severly reduced functioning).
The average score is rescaled such that the values range from 0 to 3.
Func2 Average disability score (range 1-4) squared. The variable is rescaled
such that the values ranges from 0-15.
Age Age minus 67.
Male =1 if male, =0 if female.
Non-Married =0 if married or co-habitee, =1 otherwise.
Alone =1 if persons lives alone, =0 otherwise.
Informal care Reference cathegory=no access to informal care.
Little =1 if acces to less than 5 hours a week, =0 otherwise.
Some =1 if access to 6-10 hours a week, =0 otherwise.
Much =1 if access to more than 10 hours a week, =0 otherwise.
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Table A1 continued.
Variable Description
Municipal charactristicsb
MunicInc Tax revenues and grants per capita (in 1000 NOK).
PrivInc After-tax income per capita (in 1000 NOK).
%Child Precentage of population aged 0-6 years.
%Youth Precentage of population aged 7-15 years.
%Elderly Precentage of population aged 67 years or more.
%Old Precentage of elderly population aged 80 years or more.
%MentChall Percentage of population being mentally challenged.
HostMunic =1 if the municipality were hosting an institution for mentaly challenged
persons prior to the reform in 1991, =0 otherwise.
Mortality Standardized mortality per 100 000 inhabitant, yearly average 1990-1994.
%Disabled Percentage of population aged 16-66 receiving disablement benefits.
%Alone Percentage of population above 79 years non-married, divorced or widowed.
FemWork Female work partisipation rate. Percentage of female population 20-66 years of age.
Distance Average traveling distance (in minutes) to the center of the municipality.
Pop Population size(/1000).
North =1 if the municipality lies in Northern-Norway (Nordland, Troms and Finnmark county),
=0 otherwise.
FemRepr Precentage of female representatives in the local council.
Soc Precentage of socialist representatives in the local council (left-wing parties including
the Labor party).
NOP Number of parties (and non-party groups) in the local council.
a The 17 activities and conditions are; eating, dressing, toileting, bathing, getting aroung inside, getting
around outside, preparing meals, doing laundry or housework, shopping for groceries, medical self-care,
memory and concentration, insight in own situation, feeling of security, ability to make contact with others
(create and maintain a social network), ability to take inititatives, ability to take responibility for everyday
living and ability to communicate with others.
b The variables are measured as deviation from the national mean in the analyses.
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Table A2 Descriptive statisticsa.
Variable All users Home care
Full sample Excluded Full sample Excluded
# 19234 410 14167 302
Dependent variables
Inst 0.26 (0.44) 0.26 (0.44)
Homeb 5.1 (8.4) 5.9 (6.7)
Individual characteristics
Func (1-4) 2.03 (0.84) 1.91 (0.76) 1.68 (0.57) 1.58 (0.47)
Age 81.6 (6.8) 81.1 (6.8) 80.7 (6.6) 80.2 (6.4)
Male 0.26 (0.44) 0.37 (0.48) 0.26 (0.44) 0.38 (0.49)
Non-Marriedc 0.77 (0.42) 0.74 (0.44) 0.77 (0.42) 0.71 (0.44)
Alone 0.74 (0.44) 0.63 (0.48)
Informal care
No 0.32 (0.47) 0.23 (0.43)
Little 0.25 (0.44) 0.16 (0.37)
Some 0.27 (0.45) 0.41 (0.49)
Much 0.14 (0.35) 0.19 (0.39)
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Table A2 continued.
Variable Norwayd Full sample Norway, Sample,
pop < 3,000 pop < 3,000
# municipalities 434 40 155 4
Municipal charactheristicse
MunicInc 20,971 (7,505) 19,705 (8,589) 26,520 (9,054) 33,611 (18,618)
PricInc 89,862 (11,597) 93,794 (12,317) 83,389 (8,992) 88,284 (9,783)
&Child 9,4 (1,2) 9,6 (1,2) 9,1 (1,2) 9,3 (2,0)
%Youth 11.7 (1.5) 11.8 (1.4) 11.6 (1.5) 12.1 (1.3)
%Elderly 15.9 (3.8) 15.1 (3.0) 18.1 (3.2) 18.2 (3.2)
%Old 29.6 (4.4) 28.5 (2.5) 31.6 (4.9) 29.4 (2.0)
%MentChall 0.5 (0.3) 0.6 (0.6) 0.5 (0.3) 0.4 (0.2)
HostMunic 0.08 (0.27) 0.23 (0.42) 0.01 (0.11) 0
Mortalityratef 932 (127) 918 (91) 949 (159) 886 (93)
%Disabledg 9.0 (2.6) 9.3 (2.5) 9.5 (3.0) 8.5 (3.2)
%Alone 71.1 (4.9) 70.9 (4.5) 71.3 (6.3) 65.5 (6.2)
FemWork 63.2 (5.1) 63.4 (4.4) 62.4 (5.9) 65.2 (6.2)
Distance 13.7 (10.6) 14.4 (9.8) 15.0 (14.0) 15.6 (4.6)
Pop 8,943 (16,811) 17,465 (26,538) 1,817 (689) 2,186 (573)
North 0.21 (0.40) 0.18 (0.38) 0.32 (0.47) 0.25 (0.50)
FemRepr 32.2 (8.2) 34.0 (8.8) 31.4 (10.0) 34.8 (13.3)
Soc 37.3 (14.3) 36.9 (12.5) 35.4 (15.0) 30.1 (12.9)
NOP 6.0 (1.5) 6.9 (1.4) 4.8 (1.1) 4.7 (0.5)
a Variable means, standard errors in parentheses.
b The actual number of hours of home care per week (not the natural logarithm).
c Excluding persons with missing value on the variable.
d Oslo, which also is a county government, is not included.
e The variables are measured as deviation from the national mean in the analyses.
f 6 municipalities (all pop < 3,000) have missing value on the variable. Non of these are represented in
the sample.
g 2 municipalities (both pop < 3,000) have missing value on the variable. Non of these are represented in
the sample.
Data Sources: Statistics Norway and Norwegian Social Science Data Ser-
vices’ (NSD) databank of social, economic, demographic and political vari-
ables describing each municipality. Statistics Norway and NSD are not re-
sponsible for the analysis of the data used or the interpretations made.
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Table A3 OLS estimation of the coverage ratioa.
Cons 11.57 (1.14)
MunicInc 0.191 (4.30)∗∗
PrivInc -0.110 (-3,16)∗∗
%Child -0.108 (-0.35)
%Youth -0.205 (-0.79)
%Elderly -0.249 (-1.97)∗∗
%Old 0.274 (3.55)∗∗
%MentChall -0.765 (-0.72)
HostMunic -1.046 (-0.97)
Mortalityrate 0.003 (1.17)
%Disabled 0.040 (0.27)
%Alone 0.182 (3.36)∗∗
FemWork 0.126 (1.86)∗
Distance 0.061 (2.55)∗∗
Pop -0.016 (-0.65)
North 2.101 (2.60)∗∗
FemRepr 0.038 (1.21)
Soc -0.028 (-1.31)
NOP -0.652 (-2.91)∗∗
R2adj 0.31
aN=394, t-values in parentheses.
* and ** denotes significance at 10% and 5% level respectively.
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